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Abstract:  The study of deception and the theories which have been developed have relied 
heavily on laboratory experiments, in controlled environments, utilizing American 
college students, participating in mock scenarios.  The goal of this study was to validate 
previous deception research in a real-world high-stakes environment.  An additional 
focus of this study was the development of procedures to process data (e.g. video or 
audio recordings) from real-world environments in such a manner that behavioral 
measures can be extracted and analyzed.  This study utilized previously confirmed speech 
cues and constructs to deception in an attempt to validate a leading deception theory, 
Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT).  Several measures and constructs, utilized and 
validated in existing research, were explored and validated in this study.  The data 
analyzed came from an adjudicated real-world high-stakes criminal case in which the 
subject was sentenced in federal court to 470 years in prison for creating child 
pornography, rape, sexual exploitation of children, child sexual assault and kidnapping; a 
crime spree that spanned over a five years and four states.  The results did validate IDT 
with mixed results on individual measures and their constructs.  The exploratory nature of 
the study, the volume of data, and the numerous methods of analysis used generated 
many possibilities for future research.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Deception is a ubiquitous form of communication (Handcock, Woodworth, & 
Goorha, 2010).  Several studies have looked at how frequently people lie and they 
indicate that on average, people lie almost daily (Camden, Motley, & Wilson, 1984; 
DePaulo & Kashy, 1998; DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996; Hample, 
1980; Lippard,1988).  In fact deception is a major characteristic of the most common 
communication channels; 14% of people self-reported deceiving in emails, 37% in phone 
calls, and 27% in face-to-face interactions (Hancock, 2007).  In a study by Turner, 
Edgley, and Olmstead (1975) they asked 130 subjects to keep a record of whether they 
were truthful or not in their communications throughout their day and found that over 
61% of their subjects’ conversations lacked verisimilitude. 
Just as prevalent as deception is the desire to detect deceit in human 
communication.  Despite the desire, humans are rather poor at detecting deception, 
scoring no better than chance (Vrij, Edward, Roberts, & Bull, 2000).  Current research on 
methods to assist humans at deception detection have been to a great extent focused on 
controlled settings where the researcher manipulates the study.  More to the point, it is 
impossible to ethically replicate an environment in which subjects truly have significant 
potential for loss or suffering and must deceive in order to evade high-stake loss.  It is not 
possible to simulate real risk where deceivers have a vested interest in the 
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deception because they have something significant to gain or lose.  A second aspect of 
deception not possible in a lab is contextual complexity.  It is exceedingly difficult to 
replicate the duration and complexity typical of high-stakes dyadic interactions, such as 
those which take place during law enforcement interviews.  To be of practical use current 
methods and theories need to be validated in the real-world where it is not always 
possible to control the stimuli and intrude on a subject’s freewill to deceive.   
In general studies of deception inevitably focus on behavioral indicators or cues to 
deception.  These cues can be categorized into two groups, verbal and nonverbal.  Verbal 
cues include written and spoken words and focus on the linguistic characteristics of 
speech (Burgoon, Buller, and Woodall, 1996).  Nonverbal cues include physical ways of 
communication, including paralinguistic (e.g. tone of the voice), haptic (e.g. touch), and 
kinetic (e.g. body motion) (Burgoon, et al., 1996; Schuller, Steidl, Batliner, Burkhardt, 
Devillers, Müller, & Narayanan, 2013).  
Speech is a very rich communication channel, one that contains both verbal and 
nonverbal characteristics.  Speech is also an interactive communication channel with 
many back and forth exchanges giving both parties multiple opportunities to influence 
each other in a short period of time (Buller & Burgoon, 1996).  
This study is an exploration of real-world, high-stakes (RWHS) deceptive 
behavior manifested in human speech, and analyzed by objective measures.  It is worth 
saying that this study is not a laboratory experiment, with controlled settings, in a closed 
environment.  Though several statistical tools were employed and every opportunity to 
follow sound methodology was practiced, their use was not to prove or disprove   
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hypotheses but to explore the data and examine propositions based on theory.  The 
impetus for this study came after a lengthy literature review on deception detection and 
has three tenets: (1) the state of existing theories on deception crave for validation, (2) 
outside the lab in a RWHS setting, (3) where typical dyadic interactions are long and 
more complex than those studied in a controlled setting.  These tenets are the research 
gaps identified and where it is believed the most stands to be gained by exploration.   
 
Human Performance 
The formal study of deception detection and its cues has been covered in 
numerous cross discipline studies and the consensus across the board is that humans are 
poor detectors of deceit (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Kraut, 1980; Vrij, Edward, Roberts, & 
Bull, 2000).  The most common approach to studying deception detection is to look for 
signs in the form of behavioral changes; these signs are typically referred to as cues.  In 
perhaps the most comprehensive meta-analysis of deception detection cues and their 
accuracy, Bond and DePaulo (2006), looked at 206 studies with 24,483 judgments and 
found a mean accuracy of 53.4%.  To be more colloquial, humans might as well flip a 
coin when it comes to detecting deception.  However, humans are not just inaccurate 
detectors of deceit but poor judges of what cues are indicators of deception and are often 
affected by multiple biases (Vrij, 2000).  Human bias toward unreliable deceptive cues 
hampers our ability to perceive deception and can further decrease accuracy below 
chance (Vrij, 2000). 
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Deception researchers have confirmed that the general population has a “truth 
bias” or regularly assume others are truthful in typical interpersonal encounters (Buller & 
Hunsaker, 1995; Buller, Strzyzewski, & Hunsaker, 1991; Clark, H. & Clark, E., 1977; 
Kalbfleisch, 1992; O’Sullivan, Ekman, & Friesen, 1988; Riggio, Tucker, & 
Throckmorton, 1987).  This over willingness to trust may further hinder our deception 
detection ability.  In contrast, law enforcement personnel are significantly more likely to 
respond “deceitful” rather than “truthful” in a suspect interview session (Meissner & 
Kassin 2002).  Meissner and Kassin call this “investigator bias”.  Law enforcement 
personnel who conduct interviews are trained in techniques on how to spot deceptive 
cues; some law enforcement personnel such as FBI, CIA, Secret Service, and Homeland 
Security agents receive more advanced training in human behavior.  However, even with 
advanced training human performance at detecting deception is not significantly 
increased (Akehurst, Bull, Vrij, & Koehnken, 2004; Biros, Hass, Wiers, Twitchell, 
Adkins, Burgoon, & Nunamaker, 2005; Vrij, 2000).  It has also been pointed out that law 
enforcement training on deception detection cues could be wrong and biased towards 
visual cues (Kassin & Fong, 1999; Mann, Vrij, & Bull, 2004; Vrij, Edward, & Bull, 
2001).  In an interesting study by Levine, Freeley, McCornack, Hughes, and Harms 
(2005) they compared valid deception detection training to bogus training and no 
training.  They found that the effects of both valid training and bogus training to be 
generally small and that valid training was not much better than bogus training.  They 
also suggest that even bogus training could improve accuracy over no training.  This last 
point would connote that the content of the training may be completely irrelevant, a 
piquant point considering that content was based on current theories of deception 
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detection.  These same theories are also based mostly on laboratory settings, have had 
few validations in real-world environments, and where subjects had very little at stake 
(DePaulo et al., 2003). 
 
Real-World High-Stakes 
Previous research has found that cues to deception differ when the motivation 
differs from low to high as is often the case when comparing mock-scenarios to real-
world events (Zuckerman & Driver, 1987).  RWHS deceptive environments are those 
were the parties are personally invested in the exchange and highly motivated to deceive 
or detect, depending on their role.  The world has seen a dramatic increase in real-world 
high-stakes environments since Sept 11, 2001.  From 2002 to 2011, terrorist attacks 
around the world increased 460% (Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Terrorism 
Index [GTI], 2012).  In 2011 alone 91% of terrorist attacks were successful resulting in 
7473 deaths and 13,961 injuries (GTI, 2012).  Increases in high-stakes environments 
caused by threats of terrorism has resulted in more screening at airports, border crossings, 
and other key social and environmental choke points, driving a compelling reason for 
better deception detection tool development (DePaulo et al. 2003; Elkins, Burgoon, & 
Nunamaker, 2012; Frank & Ekman 1997).  According to the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), “To a greater degree than at any point in history, individuals and small 
groups…have the ability to engage the world with far-reaching effects, including those 
that are disruptive and destructive” (DHS, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 
Report, 2010).  At the federal level there is also a push to mandate the electronic 
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recording of all interviews involving felony custodial cases (Sullivan, 2010, 2008).  This 
and many other trends toward information storage and data warehousing will increase the 
available data sets that need to be analyzed for their credibility as well as increasing the 
need for tools to guide investigators and lawyers during follow-up questioning.  
However, real-world deception detection research must overcome the wicked problem of 
establishing ground truth (Iacono, 1991). 
 
Ground Truth 
Ground truth is a verified or indisputable fact, for example adhering to evidentiary 
guidelines used in a court of law.  In a laboratory setting, establishing ground truth is a 
matter of experimental design, fully controlled by the researcher.  This same control is 
not possible in the real-world and to attempt to subject people to real stressors that would 
lead up to deceptive communication would be unethical and most likely illegal (e.g. ask a 
student to steal a computer from the schools lab and then monitor them during police 
interviews).  In addition, random assignment of participants to treatment groups is not 
possible in field studies.  These issues and other RWHS deception detection research is 
covered in greater detail in Chapter 2.  What follows is an introduction to the principle 
theory the current research is based on Interpersonal Deception Theory by Buller and 
Burgoon (1996) and the role suspicion plays in deception detection. 
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Interpersonal Deception Theory & Suspicion 
According to Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT) (Buller and Burgoon, 1996), 
the counterpart to senders’ deception is receivers’ suspicion.  IDT suggests that deception 
is a dyadic interaction and as the deception takes place, receivers may become suspicious 
of the senders attempts to deceive and may adapt their behavior because of it.  For 
example, they may choose to conceal their suspicion by quickly moving on to another 
topic or admit their suspicion and confront the sender to gauge their reaction.  Buller 
engaged in two studies that suggest that when people suspect someone is lying to them, 
they attempt to conceal their suspicion by altering their behavior (Buller, Strzyzewski & 
Comstock, 1991; Burgoon, Buller, Dillman, & Walther, 1995).  Whether or not a receiver 
attempts to conceal their suspicion, their behavior or lack thereof, may affect the senders 
behavior (i.e., deceivers may try even harder to be convincing if they believe the receiver 
is suspicious). 
At this point it is not clear whether suspicion plays a consistent role in deception.  
Therefore it is a goal of this study to better understand the impact suspicion has in a 
RWHS setting.  In addition to suspicion, IDT suggests the dyadic interaction between 
sender and receiver may change over time.  The following section will introduce the topic 
of deception over time. 
 
Deception Over Time 
The subject of deception itself is difficult to study because of the complex nature 
of human interactions and the dynamic interchange that takes place over time.  One facet 
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of complexity in human interaction over time is strategic vs. nonstrategic behavior 
(Buller & Burgoon, 1994; Zuckerman and Driver, 1987). 
Humans are strategic in their interactions and attempt to monitor multiple 
channels of communication with the intent of adapting their behavior based on how well 
they perceive their message is accepted (Buller & Burgoon, 1994).  For example, a car 
salesman may change sales strategy and back off a potential customer based on their 
initial interaction.  During a deceptive dyadic communication, deceivers often take into 
account not only what and how they convey their message but how the receiver’s 
behavior changes.  Deceivers then attempt to modify their behavior, both strategically 
and non-strategically, in response to perceived suspicion from the receiver in order to 
achieve their communication goal (Buller & Burgoon, 1994; Zuckerman and Driver, 
1987).   
In addition to the impact strategic and nonstrategic stratagems have on deceptive 
behavior, human behavior is also influenced to a large degree by whether the liar (sender) 
is telling a prepared lie or a spontaneous lie (Cody, Marston, Foster, 1984; Cody & 
O’Hair, 1983).  When comparing a prepared lie to a spontaneous lie, the prepared liar 
should be less aroused, have more control, and should not find lying as mentally difficult 
(Zuckerman & Driver, 1987).  In general, spontaneous lies contain more deceptive cues 
than prepared lies and spontaneous liars make a less credible impression (deTurck & 
Miller, 1990; Littlepage & Pineault, 1985).  Additionally, some researchers have noted an 
increase in the amount of time it takes for an individual to respond to a question 
(response latency) in situations involving spontaneous lies (DePaulo, Lindsay, Malone, 
Muhlenbruck, Charlton, & Cooper, 2003).  It stands to reason that as the duration of a 
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dyadic communication increases, like in extensive law enforcement interviews, it 
becomes more and more difficult to simultaneously maintain credibility and deception.  
The following section introduces interpersonal speech, one of the more promising 
communication channels from which to study deception detection over time. 
 
Case for Speech Communication Channel 
Almost every possible communication channel has been studied with regards to 
deception detection.  The nonverbal channel, which includes paralinguistic measures, 
conveys an incredible amount of information, some of which can be used for deception 
detection (Buller et al. 1996; Vrij 2000).  Linguistic-based cues also show promise as a 
deception detection diagnostic (Fuller, Biros, Burgoon, & Nunamaker, 2013, Fuller, 
Marett, & Twitchell, 2012; Fuller, Biros, & Delen, 2011; Ott, Choi, Cardie, & Hancock, 
2011; Tower, Jensen, Dunbar, & Elkins, 2013; Zhou, Burgoon, Nunamaker, & Twitchell, 
2004).  However, relying on any single channel may be more disadvantageous than 
relying on multiple channels or on the full spectrum of a particular channel, especially 
when those channels are closely related as with the linguistic and paralinguistic sub-
channels of speech. 
Audio recordings are commonly used in law enforcement and high-stakes settings 
for their ease of use and their admissibility in a court of law.  As stated earlier, audio is 
also a strong source of deceptive cues (DePaulo et al. 2003).  It is a one-to-many 
communication channel, namely text-based (linguistic), vocal-based (paralinguistic), and 
content cues (Buller et al. 1996; Zuckerman et al., 1981).  Content cue analysis is beyond 
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the scope of this work leaving linguistic and paralinguistic channels for analysis.  The 
author believes studying both these communication modes simultaneously will reveal 
useful information towards deception detection research.  This study hopes to find a 
synergistic effect within the speech channel showing that more cues and more types of 
cues to deception can be extracted when examining multi-dimensional channels vs. single 
channels alone.  The following section briefly addresses current deception detection 
methods and their drawbacks; each is covered in greater detail in Chapter 2. 
 
Concerns With Current Methods 
Current methods to detect deception all have drawbacks which need to be 
addressed with additional research.  Deception detection methods can be split into two 
categories, invasive and non-invasive.  Of the invasive technologies currently available to 
help identify and measure deceit, the polygraph is the most well-known.  In a summary of 
laboratory tests, Vrij reports that the polygraph is about 82% accurate at identifying 
deceivers (Vrij, 2000).  Although it is not admissible in a court of law in the United 
States, the polygraph is useful during investigations for identifying potential suspects or 
to narrow down possible leads.  However, polygraph exams have several strong limiters 
namely a willing subject, an invasive exam, and the need for a trained examiner.  The 
polygraph exam itself can evoke fear and apprehension in its subjects making it a 
controversial investigative tool. 
The newest invasive method to detect deception utilizes functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) to map blood flow in the brain during structured questioning.  
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Though initial findings are promising, fMRI shares the same restrictions as the 
polygraph.  Additional limiters to their general use are their sheer size and cost to 
operate, the fact that subjects cannot move at all, and they cannot be used on people with 
claustrophobia or metallic implants. 
One attempt at a non-invasive, unobtrusive, deception detection technology that 
would have been easily automated but which failed to stand up to academic rigor was 
voice stress analysis (VSA).  VSA was introduced in the 1970’s as a possible 
replacement of the polygraph (Rice, 1978).  VSA is a technique that analyzes the voice 
pitch changes as a measure of arousal.  The machines built around VSA are 
fundamentally designed to detect stress, not lies.  The accuracy of voice stress analyzers 
is reported to range from chance to about equal to that of the polygraph (Gamer, Rill, 
Vossel, & Godert, 2006; Vrij, 2005).  Despite its initial promise, the voice stress analyzer 
has failed to gain scientific acceptance (Ford, 2006; Hollien & Harnsberger, 2006; 
Hopkins, Benincasa, Ratley, & Grieco, 2005).  It should be noted that VSA only looks at 
pitch while the current study examined a much broader range of vocal dimensions.   
A common method used in deception detection research involves structured 
questioning.  In fact the preponderance of deception detection research looks at yes/no or 
short answer lies, like those used during a polygraph exam (DePaulo, Lindsay, Malone, 
Muhlenbruck, Charlton, & Cooper, 2003).  The yes/no response to structured questioning 
has its value but is not characteristic of RWHS questioning where interviewers typically 
ask for more details and subjects are more verbose in their responses.  Another 
predominant method in deception detection research looks at mean scores over entire 
interactions, in essence detecting general deceptive states not pinpointing lies (DePaulo, 
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et al., 2003).  This course granularity of deceptive episodes is of little practical value in 
the real world, what is needed is to identify the needle (lie) in the hay stack (interview).  
This is similar to what Meissner and Kassin (2002) call “response bias” or the threshold 
of evidence necessary for deception detection. 
Having given an introduction to the field of deception detection in a RWHS 
setting what follows is the research questions which attempt to address the gaps in 
existing research. 
 
Research Question & Contributions 
This study’s research method takes the form of a case study in a RWHS setting in 
which the communication channel of interest is speech and its linguistic and 
paralinguistic dimensions.  Based on the review of literature and the theoretical 
underpinning of IDT, a conceptual framework was developed for understanding these 
deceptive cues in RWHS environments.  From this conceptual framework a research 
model and series of propositions were developed and then used in an attempt to validate a 
leading deception theory by examining the following research question (RQ): 
RQ:  Are speech cues to deceptive behavior moderated over time by receiver 
suspicion during dyadic interactions in a real-world high-stakes setting? 
This study aimed to address three areas of deception research in hopes to 
contribute to: (1) procedures for extracting deceptive cues from real-world environments, 
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(2) identification of temporal speech patterns, and (3) granularity of deceptive speech.  
Expanding on each area it is hoped the following will be gained by the study: 
 Develop effective procedures for extracting speech-based behavioral cues in 
RWHS settings.  Given the complex and shifting nature of real-world settings is it 
even conceivable to extract speech behavioral characteristics of high enough 
quality to make reliable measurements? 
 Given an extraction procedure that produces usable data, can the veracity of 
individual messages be accurately determined using speech-based cues?  In other 
words, how fine is the granularity of deceptive speech behavior?  Having a better 
understanding of the size of a deceptive epoch may help steer other deception 
detection studies. 
 A major contribution hoped to be made with this study is to determine if speech-
based cues to deception (both linguistic and paralinguistic) change over time in a 
RWHS environment and what do these patterns look like. 
 Finally, add to the growing body of knowledge trying to answer the question 
whether deception detection can be automated using information systems tools, 
techniques, and procedures.  
In addition to the research question above, this study aimed to better the 
understanding of how people deceive when using vocal-base communication methods in 
RWHS settings.  General research questions in the context of a RWHS interview-style 
dyadic communication that follow from the primary research question are: 
 Which speech-based cues distinguish truthful from deceptive messages? 
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 Can the veracity of individual messages within a larger body of dyadic 
interactions be accurately determined using speech-based cues? 
 Are there deceptive behavioral patterns? 
 If there are patterns what do they look like? 
 Do cues change over time with respect to sender deception and receivers 
suspicion? 
An additional focus of this study was how the collection, measurement, 
processing, and management of deceptive cue data is extracted from RWHS 
environments.  The author wished to begin to understand if deception detection can be 
automated using existing information systems tools and techniques.  Finally, it is 
expected to develop a procedure for extracting speech-based cues from RWHS raw data 
sources such as video and audio recordings. 
Throughout this dissertation the term “deceiver” will also be referred to as the 
“sender” (e.g. suspect, criminal, etc.) while the person attempting to determine the truth 
will be referred to as the “receiver” (e.g. researcher, law enforcement investigator, 
detective, etc.).  Chapter 2 gives a brief overview of deception detection literature and the 
speech channel as a promising source for cues in a RWHS context.  Chapter 3 will define 
the propositions developed based on the literature review, discuss the methodology and 
measurements used in this research, as well as further justification for utilizing the case 
study methodology in this context.  Chapter 3 will also describe the procedural model 
used to process the data for analysis.  Chapter 4 will cover the results of analysis as well 
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as findings, and Chapter 5 will conclude the dissertation with a discussion on limitations 
and recommend future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The impetus for this study came after a lengthy preliminary literature review on 
deception detection.  During the initial review it became clear that deception detection 
research contains several gaps, namely: (1) existing theories on deception crave 
validation (2) that this validation needs to occur outside the lab in a RWHS setting (3) 
and where typical dyadic interactions are longer and more complex than those studied in 
a controlled setting.  These tenets are where it is believed the most stands to be gained 
and became the focus of the formal literature review. 
 
Deception & Deception Detection 
Deception is defined as “a message knowingly transmitted by a sender to foster a 
false belief or conclusion by the receiver” (Buller et al. 1996).  For as long as people have 
been lying, people have been trying to detect lies (Ford, 2006).  However, as will soon be 
seen, people’s desires far exceed their abilities.  With the advancement of new methods 
and new technology humans are continuing to pursue an automated system to assist them 
with accurately recognizing deceptive behavioral patterns.  
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Human Deception Detection Accuracy 
When asked, most people believe they can detect when someone is lying to them, 
but they are misguided.  Empirical research shows that human accuracy at detecting 
deception is little better than chance (Aamodt & Custer, 2006; Bond & DePaulo, 2006; 
Vrij, 2000).  The typical experimental procedure for determining accuracy usually 
consists of exposing subjects (i.e. receivers) to statements made by potential deceivers 
(i.e. senders).  The channel of communication varies from written statements (Fuller, 
2008; Fuller, Biros, & Wilson, 2009) to audio and video (Meservy, 2007) to face-to-face 
(Jensen, Burgoon & Nunamaker, 2010).  It is also true that few studies include 
interactions between sender and receiver (Buller & Burgoon, 1996).  Subjects typically 
indicate their judgment of trust or deception on a paper form and may be asked to explain 
what led them to their decision (Masip, Garrido, & Herrero, 2009). 
Several meta-analysis studies have been done on deception detection accuracy 
and found the mean to be 56-57% (Kraut, 1980; Vrij, 2000).  Another meta-analysis was 
performed in which they examined the accuracy of professionals trained to detect lies, for 
example, police officers, detectives, judges, and psychologists (Aamodt and Custer, 
2006).  Their analysis reported a mean accuracy of 55.5% compared to 54.2% for 
students and regular citizens.  One explanation for this counter intuitive result may be 
that, even with professional training, people often rely on misleading cues (Vrij, 2000).  
In a more recent and perhaps the most extensive meta-study to date, they found a mean 
accuracy of 53.4% (Bond and DePaulo, 2006).  The preponderance of evidence suggests 
not only that unaided humans are poor at detecting deception but that training has no 
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significant impact on deception detection accuracy rates (Biros et al. 2002; Levine, 
Feeley, McCornack, Hughes, & Harms, 2005). 
Another possible reason humans are poor at detecting deception is because many 
of the behaviors perceived as deceptive, are not.  For example, many people believe liars 
gaze less and truth tellers gaze more.  However, both Riggio and Friedman (1983) and 
DePaulo, Stone, and Lassiter, (1985) found that it is liars who tend to gaze more.  As 
already stated, research shows that the average person can detect deception about equal to 
the flip of a coin.  However, other researchers suggest humans are even less accurate than 
chance (Feeley & Young, 1998; Levine, Park, & McCornack, 1999).  When accuracy 
rates for truthful and deceptive messages are examined separately, people can detect 
truths just above 50% and deception well below 50% (Levine, et al., 1999). 
Despite what the average person’s abilities are at detecting deception there is 
something to be learned from those at the ends of the spectrum.  Just as some people are 
better at deceiving others, some people are more skillful at detecting deception.  One 
aspect of human communication that impacts deception detection accuracy is 
involvement (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  Forrest and Feldman’s (2000) study suggests 
that people who are highly involved in a task and focus mainly on verbal cues, are less 
accurate at detecting deception than people who were not involved and focus on 
nonverbal cues.  In other words, the less involved someone is in an investigation the 
better at detecting deception they may be.  Another characteristic of humans that may 
improve deception detection is self-monitoring.  High self-monitors tend to pick up on 
deceptive behaviors that other people miss (Brandt, Miller, & Hocking, 1980). 
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It could be argued that information systems are not involved in the interaction and 
by a large margin better at self-monitoring because they can measure quantitatively much 
more than humans are capable.  In order to improve their deception detection accuracy 
humans should exploit the advantages of information systems impartiality and their 
ability to self-monitor. 
 
Deception Automation 
People often communicate simultaneously across multiple channels such as email, 
video, telephone, and face-to-face.  Because of the multi-channel and often digital nature 
of communication it may be helpful to examine deceptive cues from the lens of 
management information systems (MIS) research.  The amount of information that passes 
between two people, conscious and unconscious, that must be processed in order to 
identify deceit is incredible.  The typical conversation speed is approximately 150-160 
words per minute (wpm) (Williams, 1998) while humans can consciously think 
linguistically at approximately 400 wpm (Wong, 2014).  This difference would seem to 
beg the question, why did humans evolve to process verbal communication faster than 
others can speak?  One possible answer is that humans need multimodal communication.  
Multimodal communication has been shown to have a synergistic effect on a message 
(D’Mello, & Graesser, 2010).  Several qualities of speech that communicate nonverbally 
are tone, volume, pitch, cadence, inflection, rhythm, emotion, accents, and slang, to name 
a few.  Add a kinesthetic communication layer and it becomes obvious, humans process 
an incredible about of information in simple conversations, let alone a deceptive one. 
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It is because of the large amount of information that must be considered and 
analyzed that information systems tools and methods show great promise for improving 
deception detection by assisting human receivers.  As suggested by Carlson and George 
(2004) electronically encoded media may stand the best chance for automation in support 
of deception detection and by extension the best channel for law enforcement interview 
tool development (Bazin, 2010).  They based their study on the theories that describe 
aspects of this change, namely media richness and media synchronicity (Dennis, Fuller, 
& Valacich, 2008).  Carlson and George further state that during this encoding that some 
of the variety of cues may be lost.  Therefore, cue identification is crucial to deception 
detection, here again technological advancement in information processing and 
management shows promise.  As real-time information processing power permeates to 
the desktop and handheld levels, new methodologies will need to be developed to take 
advantage of available communication channels for analysis. 
 
Real-World High-Stakes Deception 
There is an abundance of deception detection studies involving mock lies, but for 
research in high-stakes environments, such as interviews during a criminal investigation, 
it is lacking (Ben-Shakhar & Elaad, 2003; DePaulo et al., 2003; Frank & Ekman, 1997; 
Fuller, Marett, & Twitchell, 2012; Porter & Brinke, 2010; ten-Brinke & Porter, 2012).  
This has driven a strong need for more field studies in deception detection research 
(Frank & Feeley, 2003).  Vrij and his colleagues have performed a number of field 
studies involving police officers (Mann, Vrij & Bull, 2002; Vrij, 2000, 2005; Vrij & 
Mann, 2001a, 2001b).  They were the first and only (Porter & Brinke, 2010) to code the 
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nonverbal behavior of criminal deceivers during high-stakes deception.  Vrij and Mann 
(2001a) performed a case study to examine the paralinguistic behavior of a murderer 
during his police interview prior to and during his confession.  When the murderer lied he 
paused longer, spoke slower, and made more non-ah speech disturbances.  Mann, Vrij, 
and Bull (2002) found similar behavior after examining videotaped police interviews of 
sixteen convicted criminals;  they paused longer and blinked less when lying as compared 
to their baseline behavior.  With few exceptions, the call for more field studies in 
deception detection research has gone unanswered in the past decade. 
As society increasingly depends on on-line communication cyber deception and 
crime increases as well.  The severity of these crimes including human trafficking, child 
pornography, and fraud has spurred a high interest in methods to detect on-line deception 
(Hancock, 2007; Toma, Hancock, & Ellison, 2008; Whitty & Carville, 2008).  One area 
that has developed in large part to increases in on-line communication is linguistic 
analysis.  By examining linguistic characteristics, researchers are beginning to understand 
deceptive behavior in cyberspace interactions.  As far as real-world high-stakes linguistic 
analysis research there are few studies to date (e.g. Fuller, 2008; Fuller, et al, 2009).  
However, researchers have found during controlled studies that instant messaging 
deceivers tend to initiate conversations more often, write longer messages, and take 
shorter breaks between sent messages, than truth tellers (Hancock, Curry, Goorha, & 
Woodworth, 2008).  Deceivers also use fewer self-oriented pronouns, believed to be an 
attempt to distance themselves from the deception (Hancock, Curry, Goorha, & 
Woodworth, 2008; Zhou, 2005).  An increase in real-world high-stakes cyber deception 
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detection research is becoming increasingly crucial to maintain trust in digital 
communication. 
An issue with the current state of deception detection research that separates it 
from real-world settings is the fact that a vast majority of current studies utilize university 
students instructed to lie in mock scenarios (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, & Mann, 2001b).   
 
Student Subjects & Mock Lies 
A principal deception detection meta-analysis of 120 studies showed 101 used 
student subjects.  Only four of these studies (3%) involved situations where the subjects 
were not given instructions to lie but chose to do so on their own (DePaulo et al., 2003).  
There is evidence that behavior differs between those who choose to lie and those 
directed to lie by an experimenter (Feeley & deTurck, 1998).  For example, those who 
chose to lie compared to those instructed to lie made fewer speech errors and hesitations, 
and fewer references to others.  Therefore, studies utilizing real-world samples of 
subjects who either chose to be deceptive or not may contribute more deeply to the 
understanding of deception than those studies utilizing mock lie scenarios, as well as 
provide more generalizable findings.  The over use of student subjects and subsequent 
lack of generalizability to RWHS situations is of utmost importance especially where 
deception detection is most critical (e.g. law enforcement, military operations, and 
domestic defense). 
In addition to the issues of generalizability caused by using a single class of 
subjects, the use of mock scenarios has been questioned as to whether they can offer 
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better understanding into how deception occurs in a real-world setting (Pollina, Dollins, 
Senter, Krapohl, & Ryan, 2004).  Another criticism of mock lies is on the lack of 
motivation; participants do not chose to lie hence have little or no vested interested in 
whether or not they get caught (Miller & Stiff, 1993).  A lack of personal involvement in 
the lie is another critique of laboratory studies (Koper & Sahlman, 1991).  The author 
acknowledges the value of laboratory studies but believes there is a need for more 
research examining real-world high-stakes environments.   
In examining RWHS deception it is important to consider the characteristics of a 
real-world setting that separate them from the controlled setting of the lab.  Three such 
characteristics often examined by researchers are:  motivation, duration, and context.  
Considering the motivation behind deceptive attempts is one of the more common ways 
to categorize lies (Goffman, 1974).  Certainly, there are some times when people are 
more motivated to lie successfully than others.  A fisherman may not care if his friends 
find out that the trophy fish that got away was really a fingerling.  A shoplifter, however, 
might have more at stake if his larceny was discovered.  Several studies have concluded 
that telling high-stakes lies motivates people to succeed at their deception and ironically, 
makes them more detectable (DePaulo, Kirkendol, Tang, & O’Brien, 1988; DePaulo, 
Lanier, & Davis, 1983; DePaulo, Lane & DePaulo, 1999; LeMay, & Epstein, 1991; 
Forrest & Feldman, 2000; Frank & Ekman, 1997).   
Research has also shown the duration and content of a lie can influence how 
successful a person can be at deception.  Longer lies, for instance, are more difficult to 
tell than short ones (Kraut, 1978).  The idea that longer lies are more complex and 
difficult to maintain than short and simple lies seems to be common sense.  In the meta-
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analysis done by DePaulo et al., (2003) they predicted that if deceivers were required to 
sustain their deception for greater lengths of time, then cues to deception would be 
clearer and more numerous.  Their findings supported their hypothesis; duration did 
moderate the size of the effect.  When interactions were sustained for greater amounts of 
time, deceptive responses were shorter than truthful ones.   
The simplest division of deception may be into benign and exploitive lies.  Benign 
lies, commonly called “white lies” tend to have low perceived stakes, short life 
expectancies, and are often told for the benefit of others.  Exploitive lies, which are 
motivated by the selfish interests of the deceiver range from simple lies (e.g. calling in 
sick when you are just hung-over) to extremely high stakes lies (e.g. being charged with 
espionage, murder, or rape) (Phillips, Meek, & Vendemia, 2011).  For this study, benign 
lies are not the focus for two reasons; first they are extremely difficult to detect and more 
importantly, the return on investment outside of academic psychosocial and theoretical 
context, is nearly nothing.  Exploitive lies that are also high-stakes on the other hand hold 
the most potential for detection and the benefit is far more valuable to society (Utz, 
2005).  One aspect of current deception detection research is the inevitable focus on 
identifying and measuring behavioral cues to deception which will be explored next. 
 
Cues to Deception 
Deception in face-to-face conversations has been studied for many years from the 
lens of many different fields (DePaulo, & Kashy, 1998; deTurck, & Miller, 1990; Ekman, 
1992; Jensen, Burgoon, & Nunamaker, 2010; Littlepage, & Pineault, 1979; Mann, Vrij, 
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& Bull, 2004).  Several meta-analyses exist that attempt to summarize the large body of 
studies in deception and deception detection.  A meta-analysis is a summary of several 
studies and attempts to resolve inconsistencies in research.  Three previous meta-analyses 
(i.e., DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter, 1985; Kraut, 1980; and Zuckerman & Driver, 1987) 
examined cues associated with deception in a large number of studies.  For example, 
Zuckerman and Driver (1987) found in their meta-analysis that negative statements, 
verbal immediacy and discrepancies in the narrative were the most powerful indicators of 
deception.  DePaulo et al.'s meta-analysis (2003) of 158 cues to deception revealed 
several correlates of deception including the number of details in the participant's 
message and how uncertain the participant seems.  Based on these reviews, the following 
cues in Table 1 were found to be associated with deception: 
Table 1, Cues Associated with Deception 
Cue Description (Liars…) Reference 
Blinks blinked more often 
DePaulo et al., 1985; 
Kraut, 1980; 
Zuckerman & Driver, 1987 
Adaptors 
moved their hands more when 
giving responses 
DePaulo et al., 1985; 
Kraut, 1980; 
Zuckerman & Driver, 1987 
Speech Errors 
made more errors when 
speaking 
DePaulo et al., 1985; 
Kraut, 1980; 
Zuckerman & Driver, 1987 
Duration were more brief 
DePaulo et al., 1985; 
Kraut, 1980; 
Zuckerman & Driver, 1987 
Pupil Dilation pupils are more dilated 
DePaulo et al., 1985; 
Zuckerman & Driver, 1987 
Irrelevant 
Information 
include less relevant 
information 
DePaulo et al., 1985; 
Zuckerman & Driver, 1987 
Negative 
Statements 
responses contain more 
negative expressions 
DePaulo et al., 1985; 
Zuckerman & Driver, 1987 
Shrugs shrug more DePaulo et al., 1985 
Immediacy exhibit less involvement 
DePaulo et al., 1985; 
Zuckerman & Driver, 1987 
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Cue Description (Liars…) Reference 
Pitch vocal pitch is more anxious 
DePaulo et al., 1985; 
Zuckerman & Driver, 1987 
Hesitations hesitate more 
DePaulo et al., 1985; 
Zuckerman & Driver, 1987 
Leveling 
use more leveling terms (e.g., 
overgeneralized statements) 
DePaulo et al., 1985; 
Zuckerman & Driver, 1987 
Message 
Discrepancy 
messages contain more 
discrepancies 
Zuckerman & Driver, 1987 
 
The behaviors listed in Table 1 contain both verbal and nonverbal cues.  Because 
audio recording are a strong source of deceptive cues (DePaulo et al, 2003), they are 
capable of capturing many dimensions of verbal and nonverbal behavior simultaneously, 
and hold the potential for automation, the following section will discuss speech cues to 
deception more closely. 
 
Speech Cues 
Deception researchers have long been interested in speech cues (Anolli & Ciceri, 
1997; Fay & Middleton, 1941; Howard, 2011; Podlesny & Raskin, 1977; Zuckerman, 
DePaulo et al., 1981).  The relationship between verbal characteristics and nonverbal 
characteristics is an intricate one.  These two communication modes are interdependent 
with temporal referencing and the interaction of personal and situational objectives 
(Bruneau, 1980).   
 
 
 
27 
Linguistic-Based Deception Cues 
Linguistic-based and paralinguistic-based channels are promising sources of 
deceptive cues in interview style communication (DePaulo, et al., 2003).  Zuckerman et 
al. (1981) found that transcripts of verbal content were higher than any other single 
channel at detecting deception.  They also found that tone of voice was among the better 
channels for detecting deception, above that of facial expressions.  Given that speakers 
generally control what they say there must be leakage in the audio channel comprised of 
how they speak and other not so obvious aspects of what they are saying (e.g. word 
complexity patterns).  
Examining how someone speaks leads to paralinguistic information which 
includes vocal characteristics of time, intensity, frequency, and fluency as well as 
nonverbal or linguistic based characteristics including for example syntax choice and 
unintentional word choices.  Other aspects of what is spoken and their potential to carry 
deceptive cues have been studied by many researchers (Burgoon & Qin, 2006; Moffitt & 
Burns, 2009; Sporer, 1997; Vrij, 2008; Zhou, Burgoon, Twitchell, Tiantian, & 
Nunamaker 2004; Zhou, Twitchell, Tiantian, Burgoon, & Nunamaker, 2003).  Zhou, 
Burgoon and their colleagues found eight categories of linguistic cues that were above 
chance at detecting deception.  One study looking at these linguistic categories in a 
RWHS setting was performed by Fuller (2008).  Fuller, Biros, and Wilson (2009) revised 
these categories using data from a RWHS environment, namely Quantity, Specificity, 
Uncertainty, Clarity, Immediacy, Affect, and Cognitive Processing. 
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Fuller et al.’s (2009) study looked at 370 written suspect statements given during 
law enforcement interviews following RWHS criminal cases.  The seven constructs and 
the number of measures for each examined by Fuller are listed in Table 2.   
Table 2, Deception Detection Lexical Constructs 
Construct # of Measures Construct # of Measures 
Quantity 3 Immediacy 3 
Specificity 5 Affect 6 
Uncertainty 5 Cognitive Processing 3 
Clarity 5 Total: 30 
 
Two factors already discussed but which were not possible to examine in the 
Fuller data set are (1) the impact of the dyadic interaction and (2) the behavioral changes 
over time.  These constructs and their measures are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 
3. 
 
Paralinguistic-Based Deception Cues 
According to Dictionary.com (2011), paralinguistics is “the study of vocal 
features that accompany speech and contribute to communication but are not generally 
considered to be part of the language system, as vocal quality, loudness, and tempo”.  In 
other words, if linguistics is the what in human speech, paralinguistics is the how they 
speak.  Four paralinguistic domains frequently examined when analyzing speech for 
deception are:  time, intensity, frequency and fluency.  What follows is a summary of 
research in each domain and their findings. 
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Time 
Speech cues related to time are duration and the speed of verbalization.  Frequent 
measurements of time when considering deceptive speech are:  total length of the 
interaction, response length, response latency, tempo of speech, and the rate of change of 
speech.   
Researchers found that the length of interaction generally decreases with 
deception as subjects attempt to distance themselves from the lie (Feeley & deTurck, 
1998; Rockwell, Buller, & Burgoon, 1997).  Researchers reported mixed results in 
regards to response length.  DePaulo et al. (2003) found that the total response length to 
interviewer questions was not significantly different in deceptive versus truthful 
exchanges while Anolli and Ciceri (1997) reported longer more expressive responses.  
Response length seems rather content specific (e.g. yes/no questions vs. “describe in your 
own words” questions).  DePaulo et al, (2003) also reported that deceivers take up a 
smaller proportion of talk time than truth tellers.   
Another measure of time is response latency or the amount of time between the 
end of a question and the beginning of the response.  Though some reports contend that 
response latency is not significantly correlated with deception (Feeley & deTurck, 1998), 
DePaulo et al., (2003) reported an increase in latency when deceivers did not have time to 
prepare their deception.  The final measure of time frequently examined by deception 
detection researchers is tempo or the rate an individual speaks as well as the change in 
their rate.  The meta-analysis by DePaulo et al. (2003) reported somewhat mixed results; 
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the rate of speaking when a transgression was committed was significantly correlated 
with deception (see p. 101) but the rate of change was not.   
Intensity 
Cues dealing with the loudness or amplitude of speech are grouped under 
Intensity.  In general, researchers have reported mix results regarding intensity.  
Mehrabian (1971) reported a decrease in amplitude while Buller and Aune (1987) 
reported an increase in amplitude of deceiver’s speech.  DePaulo et al.’s meta-analysis 
suggested that it was not significant (DePaulo, et al., 2003).  However, variation in 
amplitude has been reported to increase during deception (Rockwell, Buller et al., 1997). 
Frequency 
Of all speech cues, perhaps frequency and pitch have been the most studied as 
possible indicators of deception.  Researchers have found a significant increase in 
frequency during deception (DePaulo, et al., 2003; Ekman, Friesen et al., 1976).  As a 
point of clarification, researchers often use the terms pitch and frequency 
interchangeably, this is not completely appropriate.  Frequency describes a physical 
phenomenon while pitch describes a perceptual phenomenon.  An increase in frequency 
variation has also been found to be correlated with deception (Vrij, 1995).   
Fluency 
Four measures of speech fluency in deception detection research are filled pauses, 
non-ah disturbances, silent pauses, and interruptions; all of which show mixed results 
with a slight decrease in fluency by researchers (DePaulo, et al., 2003).  Non-ah speech 
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disturbances include speech disturbances other than “um”, “er”, and “ah”.  Some 
researchers found that non-ah speech disturbances decrease during deception (Bond, 
Kahler, & Paolicelli, 1985) but the meta-analysis by DePaulo et al. (2003) did not find a 
significant relationship with deception.  The filled pauses include the total amount of 
“um”s, “er”s, and “ah”s in a subject’s speech while filled pause length refers to the length 
of each such filled pause.  Feeley & deTurck (1998) report an increase in filled pauses 
while Bond, et al. (1985) report no correlation with deceptive speech.  Some researchers 
have noted that deceivers commit more speech errors and hesitations (Feeley & deTurck, 
1998), while others have found no relationship between deception and filled pauses 
(Sporer & Schwandt, 2006).  The total number of silent pauses and their duration have 
also had mixed results (DePaulo, et al., 2003; deTurck & Miller, 1985).  Finally, 
interruptions, the overlaps of speech between a subject and an interviewer have also 
shown mixed results.  Some researchers report a decrease in interruptions during 
deception (Buller, Comstock et al., 1989) while others have not found a significant 
correlation with deception (DePaulo, et al., 2003). 
In general, current literature on paralinguistic-based cues to deception report 
mixed results.  This may be as a result of low RWHS data sets examined.  The five 
paralinguistic constructs and the number of measures for each are in Table 3. 
Table 3, Deception Detection Paralinguistic Constructs 
Construct # of Measures Construct # of Measures 
Fluency 6 Duration 4 
Tempo 2 Intensity 2 
Frequency 3 Total: 17 
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Discovery of cues to deception is an initial step, what follows are several methods 
developed to identify and measure deception itself. 
 
Existing Deception Detection Methods 
Many methods have been developed to detect deception with varying levels of 
success.  This review discusses the advantages and disadvantages of several of the most 
well-known methods.  Several of these methods are based on theory while others were 
developed by trial and error.  A discussion of leading theories of deception follows the 
discussion on existing methods. 
 
Polygraph 
The most well-known method of deception detection is the polygraph, a device 
that takes various cardiac, skin conductivity, and respiratory measures to detect 
deception.  It is based on the idea that these physiological measures are directly linked to 
the conditions that are brought on by deception attempts (Vrij, 2000).  The two main 
questioning techniques that are used during a polygraph are the Comparative Question 
Test (CQT) and the Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT).  The CQT establishes a baseline 
behavioral score based on a series of irrelevant control questions then compares the 
baseline scores to scores on crime-specific questions.  However, it has often been 
criticized as subjective, non-scientific, and unreliable (Ben-Shakhar & Elaad, 2003).  
CQT is reported to be accurate on deceivers from 83% to 89%, but only 53% to 78% for 
truth tellers (Bull, Baron, Gudjonsson, Hampson, Rippon, Vrij, 2004).  Regarding CQT 
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Iacono (2001) concluded that, “Although the CQT may be useful as an investigative aid 
and tool to induce confessions, it does not pass muster as a scientifically credible test.” 
The GKT compares the physiological responses to multiple choice questions 
about a crime, where one of the choices contains details about the crime only the criminal 
would know.  For example, “what type of weapon killed Mr. Green: (a) gun, (b) knife, (c) 
rope, or a (d) lead pipe?”  The GKT enjoys a more objective approach than CQT (Ben-
Shakhar & Elaad, 2003) however it has major problems.  One problem with the GKT is 
that there may be many reasons for a subject to choose the “guilty” choice and with say 
four choices, 25% of the innocent people may get false positive scores.  Accuracy rates 
for the GKT range from 42% to 76% for liars and between 94% and 98% for truth-tellers 
(Bull et al., 2004).  The general conclusion from the scientific community is that the 
polygraph is pseudoscience (Iacono 2001).  Observation of behavioral cues is another 
method used as a means of deception detection. 
 
Behavioral Analysis Interview 
Behavioral Analysis Interview (BAI) is an interview technique developed by 
Inbau, Reid, Buckley, and Jayne (2001).  BAI is a non-accusatory structured questioning 
technique designed to provoke verbal and nonverbal behavior from subjects which 
indicate deception.  Numerous studies have shown that deceivers act differently than 
truth-tellers (DePaulo et al., 2003; Ekman & Friesen, 1969; Zuckerman, DePaulo, 
Rosenthal, & Leonard, 1981).  However, most people are mistaken in their beliefs about 
which behaviors are associated with deception (Vrij, 2000).  As an example of this 
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behavior, Inbau et al. (2001) expect liars to be more nervous and less helpful.  However, 
this is the exact opposite of what other deception literature predicts (Vrij, Mann, and 
Fisher, 2006).  Vrij et al. (2006) conducted the first empirical test of the BAI technique 
where grounded truth was established.  Their results did agree with Inbau et al. (2001) 
that the technique lead to differences between liars and truth tellers, however, their results 
were consistent with existing deception literature and in the exact opposite direction of 
what Inbau et al. (2001) predicted.  For example Inbau et al. (2001) expected liars to be 
more nervous and cross their legs more often, but Vrij et al. (2006) found that liars sat 
more still than truth tellers, which is what other deception research has stated (DePaulo et 
al., 2003).  This technique shows promise but more empirical testing needs to be 
accomplished. 
 
Voice Stress Analysis 
The voice stress analysis (VSA) was introduced in the 1970’s as a possible 
replacement of the polygraph (Rice, 1978).  The VSA measures psychophysiological 
responses of the subject’s voice.  VSA procedures attempt to rely upon microtremors in 
the voice as indicators of deception.  These machines are fundamentally designed to 
detect stress, not lies.  The accuracy of voice stress analyzers is reported to range from 
chance to about equal to that of the polygraph (Gamer, Rill, Vossel, & Godert, 2006; 
Vrij, 2005).  However, other studies of VSA have yielded accuracy rates not significantly 
different than chance (Cestaro, 1996; Janniro & Cestaro, 1996).  There are commercial 
VSA systems available that claim to distinguish truth from lie but independent reports 
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fail to confirm these claims (Haddad & Ratley, 2002; Hollien, 2006).  Despite its initial 
promise, VSA has failed to gain acceptance in the scientific community (Ford, 2006; 
Hollien & Harnsberger, 2006; Hopkins, Benincasa, Ratley, & Grieco, 2005).  If that were 
not enough, a Department of Justice funded research showed "little validity" in the 
technique as well (Damphousse, Pointon, Upchurch, & Moore, 2007).   
One small advantage VSA has over many other deception detection methods is its 
adaptability to be automated.  However, VSA is highly dependent on the quality of the 
audio, so in an uncontrolled environment like a busy police station or an airport terminal 
it may be of little value. 
Though the current study examines voice characteristics, it is not VSA.  VSA 
only looks at frequencies; the current study examines 41 dimensions of human speech 
and how it is produced (e.g. duration, intensity, pitch, temporal, linguistics, etc.). 
 
fMRI 
A newer method of deception detection that has shown great promise is the 
analysis of brain activity and blood flow utilizing a functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) machine.   
Recently fMRI reached deception detection accuracy of 100% when subjects do 
not employ countermeasures (Ganis, Rosenfeld, Meixner, Kievit, & Schendan, 2011).  
fMRI measures the hemodynamic response, or changes in blood flows, that are related to 
brain activity.  This neuroimaging technique can display what is called blood-oxygen-
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level dependence (BOLD) (Ogawa, Lee, Nayak, & Glynn, 1990).  When brain cells are 
active they consume more energy which results in localized increases in blood flow to 
that area and subsequent concentrations of deoxyhemoglobin.  It is the deoxyhemoglobin 
that is the contrast in the MRI.  It has been suggested that BOLD fMRI may be sensitive 
to differences between truth and deception as seen in the activation of different regions of 
the brain (Langleben, 2008).  Researchers have noticed differences between the brain 
activity of truth-tellers and deceivers (Ganis, Kosslyn, Stose, Thompson, & Yurgelun-
Todd, 2003; Johnson, Barnhardt, & Zhu, 2004).  Additionally, researchers using fMRI 
have localized the regions of the brain that were most informative in terms of deception 
detection, namely the right prefrontal regions and the bilateral posterior cortex 
(Davatzikos, Ruparel, Fan, Shen, Acharyya, Loughead, Gur, & Langleben, 2005).  Most 
physiological methods of deception detection require the use of invasive sensors either 
attached to the body or requiring immobilization.  A subject must be willing and 
cooperative or the devices used to measure physiological reactions cannot accurately 
function.  For example, fMRI seems to work around the need for a willing subject by 
measuring blood flow in the brain, something people presumably cannot control.  
However, the fMRI machine requires the subject to be completely still; even talking 
during a scan can distort the images (Ogawa et al., 1990).  Researchers have adapted their 
methodology to utilize stimuli that do not require the subject to move their head (e.g. 
audio instructions, images, handheld input controllers). 
One criticism of fMRI use in deception detection is the temporal differences 
between electrical activity and blood flow in the brain; brain electrical activity is on the 
order of milliseconds, while changes in blood flow are on the order of seconds.  Because 
37 
there is no normative BOLD fMRI baseline, studies must rely on the difference in brain 
response between a target and control stimuli (pictures of a crime scene vs. random 
unrelated pictures).  This is referred to as “cognitive subtraction”, a method of isolation 
of cognitive processes by comparing BOLD responses to different stimuli (Aguirre, 
2010).  The use of cognitive subtraction makes the selection of appropriate target and 
stimuli critical (Aguirre & D’Esposito, 1999).   
fMRI is drawing a lot of attention not only for its reported accuracy but because it 
is based on several valid physiological and methodological assumptions; for example the 
fact that cerebral blood flow and neuronal activation are coupled (Huettel, Song, & 
McCarthy, 2004) and Ogawa’s BOLD discovery (Ogawa et.al., 1990).  However, it is 
these same apparent strengths which are drawing the most criticism namely 
methodological design flaws and the physiological differences between individuals 
(Langleben, 2008).  Other researchers have pointed to problems with replication, large 
individual brain differences and unclear brain regions associated with truth-telling 
(Spence, 2008).   
 
Statement Validity Analysis and Criteria-Based Content Analysis 
Statement Validity Analysis (SVA) is a technique for analyzing deception which 
focuses on verbal content.  SVA was originally developed for determining the veracity of 
the testimony of children in sexual abuse cases, but has since been adapted for and 
applied to other types of cases including those with adult subjects.  SVA involves an 
examiner searching for linguistic cues and gaps in a subject's statements and using 
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follow-up questions to uncover discrepancies.  Proponents of SVA say it has proven 
highly effective as a police interrogation technique; however critics argue that it 
encourages a lie bias; assuming a subject is deceptive then trying to affirm guilt before 
questioning even begins (Richard, 2008). 
One common method of SVA is Criterion-Based Content Analysis (CBCA).  
CBCA is based on the Undeutsch-Hypothesis which states that “A statement derived 
from a memory of an actual experience differs in content and quality from a statement 
based on invention or fantasy” (Vrij, Roberts, & Bull, 2000).  CBCA takes place during a 
structured interview where an interviewer trained in CBCA scores the subject’s responses 
according to predefined criteria such as logical structure.  The results of past studies 
report a wide range of accuracies from 55% to 90% (Vrij, Mann, & Fisher, 2006).   
The SVA technique has been criticized for its lack of theoretical foundation 
(Sporer, 1997; Vrij, 2000).  For example, CBCA has no formal rules for determining 
whether a statement is truthful or deceptive (Vrij, 2000).  CBCA has also been shown to 
have a truth bias; it works better at detecting truths than lies (Vrij, 2000).  Perhaps 
because of the complex training required, CBCA has been shown to have problems with 
inter-rater reliability (Godert, 2005). 
SVA and CBCA are not suitable candidates for automation because they require 
trained interviewers and coders to conduct and score the interviews.  Despite the 
adaptability of this technique, the subjective nature of CBCA, the amount of training 
required, and the delayed results limits its potential for automation (Kulaney, 1982).  To 
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help guide development and understanding of further deception detection methods 
research should be grounded in theory. 
 
Theories of Deception 
There are many psycho-social and communication theories which delve into 
deception and credibility assessment as well as interdisciplinary theories that have been 
applied to the subject.  In order to cover the leading theories a rough taxonomy is 
attempted by first separating pure deception detection theories and then covering related 
theories and perspectives.  Pure deception detection theories are further dichotomized 
into strategic and non-strategic theories. 
The majority of deception theories focus on non-strategic cues that are triggered 
by non-rational, uncontrollable behavior, and in which the sender is typically not aware 
they are occurring (Buller & Burgoon, 1994).  The principle of non-strategic cue 
development is straight forward; deceptive actions can have an emotional or cognitive 
impact on an individual which may create outwardly detectable behavior not consciously 
under the sender’s control.  However, deception is also thought to be governed by 
strategic actions.  A long stream of research suggests that individuals voluntarily adapt 
behavioral patterns in response to a receiver’s perceived acceptance of previous messages 
(Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Buller, Strzyzewski & Comstock, 1991; Burgoon, Buller, 
Dillman, & Walther, 1995; Burgoon & Qin, 2006; Clark & Clark 1977).  Senders not 
only plan and calculate their deceptive behavior in the initial interaction but continuously 
adapting their behavior during the dyadic interaction.   
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Ekman’s Cues to Deceit 
The current thinking about deception detection has largely evolved from Ekman 
and Friesen’s (1969) ideas of deceptive cues.  Paul Ekman describes two kinds of cues to 
deceit:  leakage and deception cues (Ekman, 1985; Ekman & Friesen, 1969).  Leakage 
describes the mistakes deceivers make when attempting deceit.  Deceivers try to control 
behavioral displays so as not to give themselves away, but cues associated with deception 
leak out anyway, often through communication channels that are more difficult to 
control.  Deception cues are other behavioral changes that reveal that deception is taking 
place such as fear, guilt, duping delight, and other performance related changes.  
According to this view, there are emotional correlates of deception and emotional 
expression is not entirely under conscious control.  These emotions may become 
observable and measurable behavior.  The practice of deceiving can cause a variety of 
emotions such as guilt or fear (DePaulo et al., 2003; 1992; Vrij, 2000).  For example if 
someone feels ashamed of their actions they may lie to avoid guilt, or if the stakes are 
high enough they may fear getting caught and paying the price.  Ekman (1985) also 
argued that liars may also experience what he calls “duping delight.”  Duping delight 
refers to those who experience excitement associated with the challenge of getting away 
with a lie. 
These emotions might manifest in measurable physiological conditions such as 
increased pulse, breathing rate, voice pitch, etc.  Ekman calls the deceptive cues from 
these emotions “feeling cues” (Ekman, 1992).  The flip side of “feeling cues”, Ekman 
calls “thinking cues”, those measurable behavioral cues that result from cognitive aspects 
of deception.  Similar to feeling cues, thinking cues may manifest in slower speech when 
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a lie is complex or long and may appear rehearsed when deceivers over prepare their 
story (DePaulo et al., 2003).  Table 4 summarizes Ekman’s thinking and feeling cues 
associated with deception. 
Table 4, Ekman's Thinking & Feeling Cues 
Category / Component Predicted Cognitions / Behaviors / Cues 
Thinking cues 
Those who over prepare seem rehearsed 
Those who think carefully may speak more slowly 
Feeling Cues: 
Fear 
Higher pitch 
Faster and louder speech 
More/longer pauses 
Speech errors 
Indirect speech 
Guilt (sadness) 
Lower pitch 
Softer and slower pitch 
Downward gazing 
Duping Delight 
Higher pitch 
Faster and louder speech 
Use of more illustrators 
Performance related 
thoughts and feelings 
Thoughts about whether or not the performance is 
succeeding 
Feelings about the performance 
Feelings about any fabricated or discreditable portions of 
the performance 
(DePaulo, et al., 2003; Ekman, 1992, 1985) 
If deceivers have control over the various communication channels and can 
manage the messages they send as well as the reactions of the receivers then it may be 
possible for them to suppress their unintended behavioral expressions (Buller & Burgoon, 
1994).  Other researchers argue that when this complex process is attempted some cues 
may still be leaked (DePaulo, et al., 2003; Ekman, 1992, 1985).  The Ekman and Friesen 
(1969) perspective was expanded on by Zuckerman, DePaulo, Rosenthal, and Leonard, 
(1981) into what they call the Four Factor Theory (also referred to as the Four Factor 
Model). 
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Four Factor Theory 
Zuckerman and Driver’s (1987) Four Factor Theory (FFT) is another theory with 
potential application in RWHS environments.  The Four Factor Theory was initially 
proposed by Zuckerman and his colleagues in a series of papers (Zuckerman et al., 1981; 
Zuckerman & Driver, 1985, 1987) in an attempt to explain the underlying processes 
governing deceptive behavior.  The model tries to tell why people behave differently 
when lying than when telling the truth.  FFT assumes that people are more aroused or 
anxious when telling lies than when telling the truth.  The authors defined four factors 
involved in deception that can influence behavior:  arousal, emotion, attempted control, 
and cognitive load.  According to this theory, deceivers will try to control their behavior 
to prevent disclosure of deception which ironically reveals cues to deception such as 
behavior that appears planned, rehearsed or lacking in spontaneity.  
FFT, like Ekman’s feeling cues to deceit, suggests that deceit may cause 
physiological arousal.  As an example of the arousal factor, an individual might be 
physiologically aroused due to intense questioning about a particular topic and as a result, 
voice pitch is elevated, speech errors increase and response times are altered away from 
their norm.  Several other nonverbal behaviors such as pupil dilation and eye blinks are 
also suggested to change with deception but are not a focus of this study. 
This theory is also similar to Ekman’s thinking cues to deception (Ekman, 1985).  
The FFT suggests a cognitive component to deception as well.  It is believed that 
deception is more difficult than telling the truth because our brains are taxed more when 
fabricating and maintaining cohesive facts and timelines then when telling the truth (Vrij, 
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Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2006).  Other researchers have considered that the amount and 
type of thinking may be impacted during deceptive interactions.  Creating a credible lie 
often demands that multiple layers to a story be woven together in a logical manner 
(Zuckerman et al., 1981).  These deceptive tapestries can be difficult to convincingly 
express while juggling fact and fiction without leaking deceptive cues (Anolli & Ciceri, 
1997).  Research by Schacter and Buckner (1998) as well as more recent fMRI studies 
discussed above suggest that the mental processes for retrieving an experienced memory 
are different than fabricating a false one.   
Finally, FFT asserts that lying requires people to think a lot harder than telling the 
truth does.  Researchers have hypothesized that liars, compared to people telling the truth, 
would take a longer time to respond, pause more when speaking, and deliver messages 
with few details (Vrij, Edward, Roberts, & Bull, 2000; Zuckerman & Driver, 1985).  In 
other words, a deceiver’s linguistic pattern should be simpler than a truth teller’s.  Some 
research has been skeptical about certain assumptions contained in FFT (Feeley & 
Young, 1998).  For example, McCornack (1997) argued that in some cases telling lies 
may be less cognitively difficult or less arousing than telling the truth.  For example, a 
wife asks her husband, “Do you like my new hairdo?” and he hates it but instead of 
taxing his mind and behavior to come up with a nice way to tell the truth he simply tell 
her he loves it. 
It is common practice in law enforcement interviews to “dig deeper” during 
questioning which would require a more elaborate deception as questioning goes on.  
This complexity increases cognitive load which may lead to identifiable changes in the 
behavior of the subject such as more frequent hesitations, and a decrease in frequency of 
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illustrators.  Critics of FFT often note that some of the behaviors associated with 
cognitive complexity may also be related to arousal and that it may not be possible to 
isolate exact causal antecedents (Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2006).  Critics of FFT also 
suggest that cognitive complexity may be low when deception is built from partial truths 
or past experiences (Vrij, et al., 2006).  It follows that when periods of high-stake stress 
are longer, as in the context of law enforcement interviews, cognitive load increases and 
may impact deceptive cues (Vrij et al. 2006). 
The four factors of the FFT model, with the exception of attempted control are 
primarily nonstrategic in nature.  That is, an individual displays these behavioral cues 
independent of any long-term plan of action to achieve a particular goal.  The attempted 
control of behavior is strategic in intent, but the indicators associated with this factor are 
inadvertently displayed.   
Table 5 summarizes the FFT model and provides predicted behaviors or cues for 
each factor with speech sourced cues in bold. 
 
Table 5, Four Factor Theory Summary 
Factor Predicted Behavior / Cues 
Arousal 
Greater pupil dilation 
Increased blinking 
More frequent speech disturbances 
Higher Pitch 
Feelings while lying 
Fear or guilt 
Fidget more 
Sound more unpleasant 
Distance themselves – more evasive 
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Factor Predicted Behavior / Cues 
maintain less eye contact 
Greater cognitive effort 
Longer response latencies 
More speech hesitations 
Greater pupil dilation 
Fewer illustrators 
Attempted Control 
Less spontaneous behavior 
Verbal and nonverbal discrepancies 
(DePaulo et al., 2003; Zuckerman et al., 1981) 
The claim made by FFT that deceivers will try to control their behavior to prevent 
disclosure of deception is also supported by previous research conducted by Ekman and 
Friesen (1974, 1969).  According to their sending capacity hypothesis, when people tell 
lies they try to control their behaviors but tend to pay more attention to some 
communication channels than others.  However, most people tend to focus on the 
behaviors they believe communicate the most information, like the facial movements but 
tend to forget about those behaviors that communicate little information, such as our legs 
and feet (Ekman & Friesen, 1974, 1969).  This is the basis for Ekman’s leakage cues 
mentioned above.  For example, one study found that people who watched liars’ heads 
and faces were less accurate at detecting deception than people who watched liars’ bodies 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1974).  In a summary of more than 30 studies in which judges tried to 
detect others’ deception from either single channels (i.e., only the face, body, tone of 
voice, or words) or from particular channel combinations, DePaulo, Stone, and Lassiter 
(1982) found that in all conditions where judges relied on facial cues, detection accuracy 
was lower.  This study also concluded that when judges paid attention to what liars were 
saying, they were more accurate at deception detection than when verbal channels were 
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unavailable.  This last point is why this study is focusing on the verbal channel to 
examine its potential in applied situations. 
Critics point out that pathological liars and sociopaths will not have the same 
behavioral responses to lying that the general population does.  This raised a question that 
is outside the scope of this study but interesting none the less; are those who enjoy duping 
delight sociopaths?  However, these disorders are atypical and can be diagnosed by other 
means and more importantly, are not the population FFT attempts to describe. 
 
Information Manipulation Theory 
Another way of approaching deception was proposed by McCornack (1992) in his 
Information Manipulation Theory (IMT).  IMT proposes that deceptive messages 
function because they covertly violate the principles governing conversational exchanges 
namely the maxims of quality, quantity, relation and manner.  These conversational 
maxims were originally proposed by Grice (1989) as guidelines for effective and efficient 
use of language.  In order to deceive, a sender can manipulate any combination of the 
four maxims.  IMT is also based on the proposition that it is assumed others are truthful, 
informative, relevant, and clear.  Deception occurs when speakers alter the amount of 
information that should be provided (quantity), the veracity of the information presented 
(quality), the relevance of information provided, or the clarity of information provided. 
Quality manipulations would be represented by deliberate distortions or 
fabrication of information.  The quantity of the information may be manipulated simply 
by altering the amount of information that is presented (i.e. holding back the full truth; 
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half-truths).  The relation maxim would be violated when liars manipulate the relevance 
of information such as answering a direct question with an indirect, off topic answer.  
Finally, the manner maxim of IMT can be manipulated by being ambiguous or not clear 
such as when using words with multiple meanings.  For example, in the sentence, “I 
cannot tell you how much I miss my mother-in-law’s visits”, it is not clear whether the 
subject enjoys the visits so much they cannot express their feelings or that they hate the 
visits so much they do not want to say anything.  Here, information is conveyed in an 
ambiguous fashion or with a lack of clarity.  Deception is made more complex and 
difficult to detect when people alter several or all of the maxims at the same time, though 
this becomes increasingly more difficult to perform.  IMT therefore suggests that 
deception can take on a very large number of forms (McCornack, Levine, Solowczuk, 
Torres, & Campbell, 1992).  However, if it were possible, identifying a particular 
person’s pattern of manipulations of the four maxims could improve detection accuracy.  
All four maximums are present in speech with only the relation maximum being beyond 
the scope of this study.  Based on IMT an examination of quality, quantity, and clarity 
characteristics of speech should be examined for deceptive cue and patterns. 
 
Self-Presentational Perspective 
DePaulo (1992) described the Self-Presentational Perspective (SPP) of nonverbal 
communication and attempted to bridge the conceptual void between spoken and non-
spoken communication research.  It was not until 2003 that DePaulo et al. (2003) applied 
the SPP to the study of deception. 
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DePaulo’s SPP advocates that liars and truth tellers both need to appear honest 
but that only truth tellers have grounds for their claim, while a liar’s claims of honesty are 
false.  The deceiver therefore must attempt to regulate their nonverbal behavior in order 
to appear honest.  SPP suggests that people are often not very successful in their attempts 
and that their behavior can give away their deception (DePaulo, 1992). 
SPP suggests that liars are less forthcoming, less compelling, less 
positive/pleasant, more tense, and include less unusual content than truth tellers.  
However, DePaulo et al.’s SPP is largely based on the pretext that most lies that are told 
are everyday lies (Sporer & Schwandt, 2006).  Despite any overlap in the predictions of 
the self-presentational perspective with prior theories of deception, SPP may be most 
applicable when examining white lies and therefore is of less interest in RWHS deceptive 
environments. 
 
Media Richness Theory 
Another promising theory coming from the MIS field that lends strong support for 
the current research is Media Richness Theory (MRT) by Daft and Lengel (1986).  MRT 
defines media richness as the ability of information communicated on the medium to 
reduce equivocality.  It tries to explain that richer, more personal means of 
communication are generally more effective for communication of equivocal issues than 
leaner, less rich media.  It suggests that the richer a medium the more information that is 
communicated.  It assumes that resolving ambiguity and reducing uncertainty are the 
main goals of communication.  In deceptive communication this assumption is reversed 
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for the deceiver.  The goal of the sender is to appear as if this assumption is valid while 
the reverse assumption is their true objective.  MRT states that media richness is a 
characteristic of a communications channel that affects the ability of that channel to 
support messages with varying levels of cogitative and affective content (Carlson 1995;; 
Daft and Lengel 1986; Zigurs and Buckland 1998).  The broad levels of media channels 
in order of richness are face to face, video, audio, and then text messages.  More recent 
research has failed to support the full breadth of the original MRT (Dennis & Kinney 
1998; Dennis & Valacich,. 1999).  However, MRT does suggest that the selection of 
speech as a rich medium to explore for deceptive cues is a sound one because speech 
carries multiple channels of communication simultaneously (i.e. it is a very rich medium 
which can be used to reduce equivocality or manipulated to possibly increase deception). 
 
Signal Detection Theory 
Though Signal Detection Theory (SDT) is not a deception detection or credibility 
assessment theory per se, it is a supporting theory to this research because the voice can 
be treated as a signal for data analyze.  SDT developed by Green and Swets (1966), 
defines two sets of probabilities in a test, in which two possible state types must be 
discriminated.  In the context of deception detection, the two possible stimuli types are 
deceptive and truthful intent.  If the actual intent is deception and the output judgment is 
suspicion, the trial is a "hit”.  If the actual intent is truthful and the output is judged 
suspicion, it is a "false alarm".  If the actual intent is deceptive but the judgment is one of 
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trust, it is a "miss".  Finally, if the actual intent is trustworthy and the judgment is one of 
trust, it is a “correct decision” as shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6, Possible Judgments from SDT 
 
Judgment 
Suspicion Trust 
Actual Intent 
Deception Hit Miss 
Truthful False Alarm Correct Decision 
 
According to SDT, the output of such a binary test is based on the value of a 
decision variable, which in the context of deception detection is the trust/suspicion 
judgment level.  The threshold value of the decision variable is called the criterion.  For 
humans, the selection of a criterion is not only related to the value of actual stimuli but 
also related to their psychological characteristics.  In other words, the criterion is a 
function of perceived stimuli which in the context of deception detection are the 
behavioral deviations.  The SDT calculation methods described in Stanislaw & Todorov 
(1999) can be used to study the distribution of the values of the suspicion level variable 
across the behavioral profile deviations to determine the appropriate criterion for the final 
decision making. 
 
Interpersonal Deception Theory 
One of the more promising theoretical foundations to examine deception detection 
during interview-style communication is Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT) (Buller & 
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Burgoon, 1996, 1994; Burgoon & Buller, 1994; White & Burgoon, 2001).  IDT is by far 
the most encompassing theory on deception research with 18 propositions and 42 
hypotheses.  IDT  models deception as an interactive dyadic communication between 
sender and receiver in a back and forth nature where each is simultaneously encoding and 
decoding messages over time then adapting their behavior to meet their goal, deception 
(sender) or detection (receiver).   
 
Figure 1, Interactive Deception Model (Adapted) 
Figure 1 illustrates the model proposed by IDT.  According to this model, both the 
sender and receiver of deception bring to an interaction their expectations, goals, 
familiarity, etc.  During the interaction the sender will begin his or her deceit with certain 
strategies but will modify those strategies throughout the interaction based on perceived 
deception success. 
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The receiver, on the other hand, begins with some level of suspicion, which 
changes throughout the interaction based on credibility judgments they make on the 
senders behavior.  Although it is suggested that suspicion plays a role in both senders’ 
and receivers’ behavior (Buller & Burgoon, 1996), another issue is the concern with 
whether suspicion affects cue intensity.  Specifically, when people are more suspicious 
are the cues of deception more or less pronounced in the sender?  Some scholars have 
found that suspicious subjects are no more accurate at detecting deceptive cues than naive 
subjects (Mattson, 1994).  Bond and Fahey (1987) argued and Hubbell, Mitchell and Gee 
(2001) found that this could be because suspicious people are lie bias; more likely to 
interpret ambiguous information as lies rather than truths.  This is particularly 
problematic for those pre-disposed to lie bias (e.g. law enforcement).  However, 
McCornack and Levine (1990) argued that accuracy may depend on the level of 
suspicion.  Specifically, they found that moderate levels of suspicion led to greater 
accuracy when judging deception. 
In either case both parties will likely inadvertently reveal linguistic and 
paralinguistic cues of their psychological state.  In the end, both sender and receiver are 
able to evaluate their success at deceiving and detecting deceit, respectively.   
IDT is also the leading theory of deception that views deception as strategic 
communication.  According to the authors of IDT, communication includes both strategic 
and nonstrategic behaviors.  Strategic behavior refers to large-scale plans and intentions, 
not necessarily to specific routines or tactics.  Non-strategic behaviors reflect 
unintentional, unconscious behavior also labeled leakage (Ekman & Friesen, 1969).  
During the interaction, both parties may alter their strategies as they perceive the 
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effectiveness of their discourse.  IDT proposes that unintentional behavioral leakage will 
occur from both sender and receiver during the interaction which may reveal their 
deception or suspicion respectively.  Specifically, IDT argues that deceivers’ strategic 
attempts to appear honest are often poorly executed and nonstrategic behaviors may be 
beyond the liar’s control. 
One extrapolation from IDT that can be made is that IDT supports the 
development of unbiased tools for deception detection (Burgoon, Nunamaker, George, & 
Biros, 2007).  For example, compare human familiarity and computer information 
systems on bias.  The theory argues that familiarity may lead to both truth bias and lie 
bias.  It may seem counterintuitive but the better a subject is known, the less effective one 
is at detecting their lies (McCornack & Parks, 1986).  Specifically, familiarity increases 
confidence which leads to truth bias (others are perceived as honest).  Stiff, Kim, and 
Ramesh (1992) found that truth bias was positively associated with familiarity and 
negatively associated with deception detection accuracy.  In other words, in relationships 
based on trust, a truth bias is likely.  McCornack and Levine (1990) also found the 
negative of this to be true; in adversarial relationships (e.g. law enforcement & suspects), 
a lie bias (believing others are dishonest) becomes more likely.  In either case familiarity 
may lead to biases which make one less accurate at detecting deception.  However, 
information systems tools have no familiarity and can be built to avoid biases typical of 
humans.   
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IDT & Law Enforcement Interview Process 
IDT is also a good theoretical match to the law enforcement interview process 
where interviews are typically longer and more numerous than lab studies will allow.  
These longer interactions may intensify the impact of repeated questioning, making it 
harder to lie while giving law enforcement personnel more opportunity to identify the 
deception.  It is also possible with longer interactions that patterns of behavior will 
appear which can be examined for changes that correlate with deception. 
This interview process is depicted in Figure 2 below.  Law enforcement 
interviews are typically recorded with audio or video equipment for post-interview 
analog analysis and possible legal evidence; not for real-time analysis.  Any behavior 
changes must be captured by the investigator during questioning in order to have a direct 
impact on the outcome of that interview session.  Any behavior changes caught after the 
fact during analog analysis may be of much less value because the sender is given time 
for post-interview processing.  Real-time feedback would give the interviewer a serious 
advantage over the sender because they could dynamically change their questioning 
technique, giving the sender little time to adapt. 
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Figure 2, Deception Detection Feedback Loop 
In reference to Figure 2 above, (1) during the law enforcement interview audio 
recordings are made.  (2a) These recordings are later transcribed by a third party or by 
law enforcement personnel themselves for (2b) further case analysis or evidence in a 
court of law.  (3a) If significant cues to deception can be extracted from speech (3b) and 
processed real-time by decision support systems, the potential exists to provide an almost 
immediate feedback loop to the law enforcement investigation team.  (4) This close to 
real-time feedback could significantly assist law enforcement questioning by identifying 
possible deception attempts or reactions to key questions. 
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IDT & Theory Validation 
Theories on deception need validation in RWHS settings.  This study focused on 
IDT, one of the most referenced theories on deception detection and attempted to validate 
it in a real-world high-stakes case study (validation of other deception detection theories 
is left for future research). 
To address the major gaps in current deception detection research and in an 
attempt to validate portions of IDT within these gaps, the following modifications are 
made to the previous IDT model (see Figure 3).   
 
Figure 3, Overlay of Law Enforcement Interview Process on IDT 
 
IDT is centered on the interactive process so the current study focused on the 
dyadic interaction; leaving the pre- and post-interaction phases to later research. 
57 
The interactive portion of the model is encapsulated in a RWHS environment.  
Within this environment the communication channel of focus is speech, a highly 
interactive and multi-dimensional channel that lends itself to automation of cue 
processing.  To address the aspect of change over time suggested by IDT the 
question/response loop has been broken down into epochs of decreasing duration.  With 
the exception of the third level these follow an implicit hierarchy of six different sizes 
from largest to smallest, specifically:  1.) all sessions between sender and receiver, 2.) 
individual sessions, 3.) 1.6 hour sections, 4.) question/response pairs by topic, 5.) 
individual question/response pair, and 6.) individual words.  The third level was chosen 
as a point of reference base on work by Kassin, Leo, Meissner, Richman, Colwell, Leach, 
and Fon, (2007) in which 631 police investigators were questioned on the average 
duration of questioning sessions.  The average duration of a RWHS questioning session 
was 1.6 hours.  This provides the opportunity to make comparisons within and between 
epochs.  Table 7, Epoch Descriptions, describes each epoch level and the general levels 
of evaluation which can be performed.  
 
Table 7, Epoch Descriptions 
Epoch Length Description Evaluation Point 
All Sessions 
All interactions between 
receiver and sender 
regardless of breaks 
E1; {Truthful vs. 
Deception} 
Each Session 
Each continuous interaction 
separated by breaks without 
communication 
Same as above plus 
patterns: 
Between:  E1→E2→E3 … 
Within:  ∆E1 ; ∆E2 ; ∆E3 … 
1.6 Hours ~ 96 minutes 
Same as above up to n: 
E1→E2→E3→E4…En 
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Epoch Length Description Evaluation Point 
Topics 
Groups of 
question/response pairs 
separated by topic 
Same as above. 
Each Q/R Pair Each question/response pair Same as above. 
Words Individual words 
Same as above however 
several linguistic cues will 
be null. 
 
“All Sessions” is defined as all recorded interactions between receiver and sender 
regardless of time or frequency of session interruptions.  Because this level encompasses 
a single mean for each indicator across the entire data set, comparisons and tests for 
patterns is very limited even though this is the level at which many deception detection 
studies base their comparisons.  Because of these limitation this level of granularity was 
left for further study when other RWHS data sets can be gathered.  “Each Session” was 
defined as a continuous interaction separated by breaks without communication.  These 
breaks could be days or minutes in duration (e.g. a break for lunch, restroom, or sleep).  
Due to the very large data set this study focused on the sub-epochs in a single session 
leaving multiple session analysis for future study.  As discussed “1.6 Hours” level was 
chosen as a reference point matching RWHS durations typical of law enforcement 
interviews.  This level may prove to be less valuable in the current case study but will 
make comparisons to other studies and data sets more compatible.  “Topic” level is 
defined as groups of question/response pairs separated by changes in content topic.  
During dyadic interactions the questions/response can go both ways (i.e. sender asks for 
clarification; receiver asks follow up questions).  This level of epoch granularity may 
seem to go against potential automation.  Identification and separation of content is very 
difficult even with advanced computing and artificial intelligence (Pudota, N., Dattolo, 
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A., Baruzzo, A., Ferrara, F., & Tasso, C., 2010).  However, implementation would 
greatly simplify topic separation; the receiver or an accomplice simply indicates a change 
in topic electronically during interviews.  “Each Q/R Pair” level is defined as each 
question/response pair regardless of topic.  This level is important to examine because it 
is common for deceivers to mix deception and truth to appear more believable.  “Word” 
level is simply defined as each individual word.  The lowest level possible from a 
linguistic point of view would be the combination of sounds used to make words, 
however their examination is beyond the scope of this study.  It is worth noting that many 
studies on audio compare levels of granularity down to 1/30 second.  This is done 
because the duration of time matches frame rates in video, making comparisons between 
audio and video simpler.  This level of granularity is outside the scope of this study 
because it does not consider video; however this could prove to be productive in a future 
study. 
In addition to the modifications proposed to the IDT model, the context and 
relationship within which the interactions take place are restricted to a RWHS context 
where the relationship between sender and receiver is one in which the receiver is 
authorized and directs questions toward the sender; typical of a law enforcement 
interview.   
Research Question & Propositions 
Based on the above literature review and to a greater extent the theoretical basis 
of IDT, the primary research question (“Are speech cues to deceptive behavior moderated 
60 
over time by receiver suspicion during dyadic interactions in a real-world high-stakes 
setting?”) is expanded to include the following seven propositions: 
P1:  The difference in speech cues to deceptive behavior will be moderated over time 
by the level of suspicion. 
P1A:  The magnitude of speech cues to deceptive behavior will be positively 
related to an increase in level of suspicion. 
P1B:  The level of moderation by suspicion will be strongest when epochs are at 
the topic level. 
P2:  Speech cues during deceptive behavior will form identifiable patterns that differ 
from speech cue patterns during truthful behavior. 
P2A:  Patterns of speech cues during deceptive behavior will be most detectable 
when epochs are at the topic level. 
P3:  As the granularity of epochs decreases (epochs gets smaller), the number of 
speech cues to deceptive behavior will increase to an apex then decrease. 
P3A:  Speech cues will have the highest correlation with deceptive behavior when 
epochs are at the topic level. 
Based on this literature review we know that the majority of studies on deception 
detection, and by extension the theories used to explain deceptive behavior, took place in 
controlled environments with structured questions.  Furthermore, the population studied 
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consisted mostly of college age students from universities who participated either for 
minor monetary incentive or as a requirement in a course.  These studies were also 
designed around specific mock scenarios with low-stakes for the deceiver if they were 
“caught”. 
What the current study is going to illustrate is whether the measurements and 
constructs common in many deception detection research (i.e. linguistic and 
paralinguistic) can hold up under a real-world, high-stakes environment.  Linguistic and 
paralinguistic measurements and the leading deception detection theory, IDT were used 
to help focus the study onto a manageable subset of deception research. 
This chapter described existing deception detection methods, leading deception 
theories, and the measurements that are common to those theories.  In addition, the need 
for more RWHS deception research was summarized.   
The following chapter will detail the methodology used to answer the 
propositions above based on the literature review.  Chapter 3 will also explain the 
development of a set of constructs for studying deception detection in a RWHS setting 
given the new model of IDT proposed.   
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY & ANALTICAL APPROACH 
This chapter presents the case study data, how it was gathered and prepared for 
analysis, what measures were examined, and the analytical approach taken in order to 
examine the main research question and the propositions. 
Core to this study is the exploratory nature of real-world cases and how IDT 
explains the relationships between examined behaviors and deceptive states.  The 
characteristics of IDT and the real-world law enforcement interviews discussed above 
that are examined in this study are:  dyadic communication, high-stakes, duration, and 
multi-channel speech communication.  It is believed that cues extracted from audio 
recordings of these interviews would lead to identifiable behavioral patterns over time.  
Next is a description of the case study methodology.  Initially, the use of a single case 
study methodology is clarified in this context followed by a description of the case itself.  
Next, is a description of the behavioral measures taken from the speech channel and a 
detailed explanation of the data processing model used to transform them into an 
analyzable format.  Finally, a description of the analysis methods used is given, which are 
both statistical and exploratory in nature. 
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Case Study Methodology 
When relevant behaviors cannot be manipulated or to do so would be unethical 
(e.g. felony, fraud, murder, assault) a case study is the ideal methodology (Yin, 2009).  
According to Yin (2009) a case study is, “an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”.  The case study is 
an exploratory method that allows the retention of the holistic and meaningful 
characteristics of real-life events during the exploration of the complex and often ill-
defined topic of deception.  Exploratory studies attempt to answer how and why 
questions with the hope of better understanding a problem or situation that has not been 
clearly defined.  In contrast, explanatory studies are more suitable for causal questioning.  
They build on exploratory studies and attempt to explain why a well-defined event 
occurs.  In an exploratory, real-world case study the questions deal with operational 
associations that need to be examined over time, rather than statistical frequencies alone.  
A major strength of case studies is their ability to trace changes over time while not being 
limited to cross-sectional or static assessments (Yin 2009).  Because of the wicked 
problem of establishing ground truth in RWHS deception and the unethical feasibility of 
laboratory experiments, case studies based on field data seem to be the experimental 
design with the greatest chance to further the understanding of deception detection. 
In regards to experimental design, case studies are commonly regarded as quasi-
experimental where behaviors cannot be manipulated but the logic of experimental 
design can still be applied (Cook & Campbell, 1979).   
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Many examples of successful case studies can be found in top pier journals across 
every discipline.  From the field of MIS, Ravishankar, Pan, and Leidner, (2011) 
published a case study in Information Systems Research (ISR) on the implementation of a 
knowledge management system (KMS).  This example points outs the importance of 
using a case study to fill research gaps.  Ko and Dennis (2011) also performed a KMS 
case study, this time within a single pharmaceutical company exploring the impact of 
time and experience.  The Ko and Dennis (2011) case study is a good example of a study 
where N=1 (i.e. the pharmaceutical company) but the focus of the study and the unit of 
analysis was a subunit within N.  A final example of a top tier journal using case studies 
is by Malhotra, Majchrzak, Carman, and Lott, (2001) who published in MIS Quarterly.  
Malhotra et al.’s, (2001) case study involved the behavior of team members utilizing 
virtual computer-mediated collaboration technology to develop a radically new rocket 
engine.  This is a good example of using a case study when conditions are unique and 
difficult to replicate.  Similar examples can be found in any discipline, the point being 
that case studies, if implemented properly, can produce solid contributions to the body of 
knowledge in a field of study. 
There are some prejudices against the case study method according to Yin (2009); 
the greatest is a concern for a lack of rigor.  Too often case studies are attacked for being 
sloppy and not systematic in their procedures (Yin, 2009).  To address this concern the 
utmost care must be given to meticulous documentation of processes and methods to a 
level equivalent or beyond those of experimental design.  Another prejudice critical of 
case studies is an apprehension that they provide little basis for scientific generalization.  
Case studies, like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to 
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populations (Thomas, 2010).  The goal of doing a case study and an experiment are the 
same, to expand and generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to enumerate 
frequencies (statistical generalization).  A third concern is that case studies take too long, 
result in massive, unreadable documents.  This does not have to be the case and stems 
from confusion with data collection methods like ethnography and participant-
observation.  Ethnography is a study of cultures and requires vast periods of time in the 
field (Fetterman, 1989).  Participant-observation research requires intimate familiarity 
with the group being studied (Jorgensen, 1989).  Case studies are a form of inquiry and 
do not rely on these methods alone (Yin, 2009).  
 
Table 8, Complementarily of Case Studies and Statistical Methods 
 Case Studies Statistical Methods 
Strengths 
Depth Breadth 
High conceptual validity 
Understanding how widespread a 
phenomenon is across a population 
Understanding of context and 
process 
Measures of correlation for 
populations of cases 
Understanding of what causes a 
phenomenon, linking causes and 
outcomes 
Establishment of probabilistic levels 
of confidence 
Fostering new hypotheses and new 
research questions 
 
Weaknesses 
Selection bias may overstate or 
understate relationships 
Conceptual stretching, by grouping 
together dissimilar cases to get 
larger samples 
Weak understanding of occurrence 
in population of phenomena under 
study 
Weak understanding of context, 
process, and causal mechanisms 
Statistical significance often 
unknown or unclear 
Correlation does not imply causation 
 Weak mechanisms for fostering new 
hypotheses 
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Case studies and statistical methods can complement each other.  Table 8 lists 
some strengths and weaknesses of both.  One final justification for using case studies is 
that they can offer important evidence to complement experiments; an adjunct to 
experiments rather than an alternative to them.  This is the approach taken for this study.  
Next, is a description of the case itself including steps taken to collect data. 
 
Case Description - The James Perry Case 
Please note:  this case has been adjudicated and all identifiable information is 
publically available upon proper request.  In Nov 2004, James Perry was sentenced in 
federal court in Madison, Wisconsin to 470 years in prison for creating child 
pornography, rape, sexual exploitation of children, child sexual assault and kidnapping, a 
crime spree that spanned over a five year period.  It is the longest sentence for sex crimes 
in Wisconsin history and there is no option for parole.  What follows is a detailed 
background of the subject and crimes committed, followed by a description of the data 
collection process. 
 
Background 
In 2004 James Perry committed his final assault which led to his capture.  Perry, a 
husband and father of two young girls, entered a Madison, Wisconsin hotel with the 
intent of committing a sexual assault.  This incident was only one of two times Perry was 
ever caught on film despite targeting very public locations.  It was a key piece linking 
him to a long series of rapes and assaults over five years and four states.  Upon entering 
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the hotel Perry proceeded to a back elevator where he saw a 13 year old girl entering an 
elevator alone.  He assaulted the young girl at gun point when she tried to exit the 
elevator.  The girl resisted, at one point saying, “Jesus, Jesus I love you.” to which Perry 
told her to shut up; Perry later said that this statement impacted him and made him feel 
guilty for his actions.  Perry exited the building through a back stairwell door with the 
girl where she saw friends unpacking their car down at the end of the lot.  She screamed, 
broke free of his hold, and ran; Perry ran in the other direction and escaped.  At the same 
time the FBI was investigating a child pornography ring of which Perry was involved.  
Their investigation led them to a cabin in upstate New York where they arrested Thomas 
Redeker.  A video of Redeker and Perry engaged in sexual activity with young children 
was found.  Redeker turned in Perry and gave the FBI his contact information.  Within 
hours 17 FBI agents and local police surrounded Perry’s house. 
Only a few days after the assault and attempted abduction of the 13 year old girl 
the FBI arrested Perry for his involvement in the internet child pornography ring.  When 
they searched Perry's house they found videotapes and 121 CD-ROMs containing hours 
of child pornography and dozens of pictures almost all of pre-teen girls.  Perry stalked 
these children in malls, county fairs, public pools, parking lots, and toy aisles in 
department stores.  Included among the evidence were videos of Perry sexually assaulting 
two 8-year-old girls.   
Det. Maureen Wall of the Madison PD became aware that the serial rapist she had 
been hunting was in FBI custody.  The FBI was not aware of the rape and assault charges 
at that time.  Perry did not want to talk to Madison PD because he was trying to negotiate 
with the FBI on a proffer plea deal to try to get only six years in prison for manufacturing 
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child pornography.  A proffer agreement is a written agreement between the prosecutor 
and an individual allowing the individual to provide information about a crime or 
possible crime to the government, with the assurance that his words will not be used 
against him in the government's case in the event of a subsequent trial.  Det. Wall 
informed the FBI about the plethora of crimes he committed as “The Mall Rapist”, a 
name the news stations called him at the time; all plea bargaining on federal charges 
stopped so Det. Wall could conduct the interview.  The Madison PD had a list of 45 
victims but believed there were hundreds more. 
Meanwhile the media began running stories portraying Perry as a monster.  He 
later told Det. Wall those stories made him really mad and that he did not want his 
mother, wife, and daughters to believe that he was a cold, brutal, monster who beat and 
raped women and children.  Det. Wall said in her statement that Perry wanted the chance 
to craft the story in his own words, from his own perspective, and give admissions to only 
a handful of crimes that did not appear to be violent – even though he actually did do 
those things.   
Only after the interview and when Perry became aware of all the evidence against 
him a plea agreement was made to stop adding on charges (over and above the 125 he 
was now being charged with).  Again, after the interview Perry wanted to expedite his 
sentencing and avoid a trial and a media circus that would paint him as a monster.  There 
were no other considerations in the plea agreement.  The time of initial FBI arrest and 
sentencing took place within a one year period. 
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Data Collection 
Law enforcement videotaped three consecutive days of interviews totaling 14 
hours and 27 minutes of video.  Interviews were conducted by the same lead detective 
and her partner in the same room and under the same conditions with Mr. Perry and his 
attorney.  Interaction was primarily between lead Det. Wall  and Mr.  Perry, only minor 
contributions (less than five minutes total) were made by the second detective and Mr.  
Perry’s attorney; their voices were removed before analysis.  A 200 page law 
enforcement transcript was generated by the lead detective immediately after the 
interviews.  The law enforcement transcript contains all questions asked and the 
responses, often in quotations with additional pertinent notes by Det. Wall.  Both the 
videotaped interviews and law enforcement transcripts were used in federal court. 
 
Ground Truth 
Ground truth was established by the lead detective based on credible evidence 
admissible in a federal court.  The lead detective identified four types of statements:  
confirmed lies, suspected lies with evidence, suspected lies without evidence, and the 
truth.  Known lies were those statements proven to be false by evidence admissible in 
court.  When the sender made these statements law enforcement personnel knew for a 
fact he was lying.  Suspected lies with evidence were those statements law enforcement 
personnel had disputing evidence on, however for various reasons that evidence was not 
or could not be admitted into federal court.  Suspected lies without evidence were those 
statements law enforcement personnel believed, in their expert opinion, to be false but for 
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which they had little or no evidence.  The final type of statements are truthful, were the 
law enforcement personnel knew were the truth or had no reason to believe they were 
false. 
Prior to receiving any data the Oklahoma State University Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) was contacted and all IRB procedures were completed.  Following IRB 
approval contact was made with the Madison, Wisconsin Chief of Police and the lead 
detective in this case.  A written request for the data stating the purpose of the request and 
detailing procedures to keep the data secure was sent.  Following approval by the Chief 
of Police the raw data was copied to CD and mailed along with the written law 
enforcement transcript coded with the lead detective’s level of suspicion.  The following 
section describes the dependent variables and how they were captured.  Next is a 
description of the constructs and their measurements followed by a description of the 
independent variable and moderator variable, Suspicion. 
 
Measurements 
The model consists of 41 total measures across the 12 deception detection 
constructs.  The linguistic-based cue constructs are:  Quantity, Specificity, Uncertainty, 
Clarity, Immediacy, Affect, and Cognitive Processing.  Paralinguistic-based cue 
constructs are:  Time, Intensity, Frequency, Fluency, and Duration.   
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Linguistic-Based Constructs Development 
The initial model contained linguistic-based constructs from Fuller, Biros, and 
Wilson (2009).  Fuller et al.’s constructs were chosen because they generated almost 74% 
accuracy in deception detection, the data was RWHS field data taken in law enforcement 
environments with solid ground truth validation, and the units of measure were written 
statements.  This matches the current data set with the exceptions that it is a transcript of 
a law enforcement interview and the unit of measure varies from topic level to 
question/response pairs; both of which are a focus of the study.  In addition to the seven 
linguistic constructs by Fuller, listed above, an eighth construct of Severity was also 
considered by them to be important.  However it is not a part of the current study because 
its measure would be constant across the current data set.  The current data comes from a 
serial rapist, the punishment for which was life in prison.  The lead detective in this case 
would assign the maximum severity score of five on the one to five scale used by Fuller.  
The Fuller constructs along with their measurements are described in Table 9, Linguistic-
Based Constructs and Their Measurements.   
 
Table 9, Linguistic-Based Constructs and Their Measurements 
Construct Construct Measurement Brief Description 
Quantity # of Words, Verbs, & Sentences Length of message 
Specificity 
Sensory ratio, Spatial ratio, 
Temporal ratio, Content Word 
Diversity, Bilogarithmic Type-
Token-Ratio 
Amount and type of details in the 
message 
Uncertainty Certainty Terms, Tentative 
Terms, Modal Verbs, Passive 
Relevance, directness, and 
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Construct Construct Measurement Brief Description 
Voice, Generalizing Terms certainty of message 
Clarity 
Redundancy, Sentence Length, 
Complexity Ratio, Average Word 
Length, Causation Terms. 
Message clarity and 
comprehensibility 
Immediacy 
1st person pronouns, 2nd person 
pronouns, 3rd person pronouns 
Attempts to disassociate oneself 
from the events described 
Affect 
Activation, Imagery, 
Pleasantness* 
Emotions present in the message 
Cognitive 
Processing 
Exclusive Verbs, Motion Words, 
Cognitive Processing Terms. 
Increased or decreased cognitive 
processing and cognitive 
information present in the 
message related to veracity 
* Note, Fuller et al. (2009) used positive and negative measures for each Affect 
measure, this study combines the positive and negative into a single bi-polar measure for 
ease of processing. 
 
Paralinguistic-Based Constructs Development 
The initial model is based on vocal constructs examined by Meservy (2007).  
These constructs and their measures were selected for this study because they represent a 
thorough coverage of the audio channel and tools exist to measure each consisting of:  
Fluency, Duration, Tempo, Intensity, Frequency, and Voice Quality (Anolli & Ciceri, 
1997; DePaulo et al. 2003; Rockwell, Buller et al. 1996; Scherer, Feldstein et al. 1985; 
Zuckerman et al., 1981).  However, because the construct Voice Quality contains cues 
that are difficult to measure objectively without the aid of a human evaluation this 
construct was removed; a focus of this study is on identifying behavioral cues that can be 
objectively measured and potentially automated.  The Meservy (2007) constructs are 
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described along with their measurements in Table 10, Vocal-Based Constructs and Their 
Measurements. 
 
Table 10, Vocal-Based Constructs and Their Measurements 
Construct 
Construct 
Measurement 
Brief Description 
Fluency 
1. Non-ah disturbances 
2. Speech errors 
3. Interruptions* 
4. Silent pauses 
5. Filled pauses 
1. Speech disturbances other than “um”, “er”, 
“ah”, and other such words 
2. General speech errors 
3. Overlaps of subject and interviewer that 
results in a change of turns 
4. Various pauses in conversation 
Duration 
1. Length of interaction 
2. Response length 
3. talking time 
4. Response latency* 
1. Total time of dyadic interaction 
2. Length of sender’s response 
3. Proportion of total time sender talks 
4. time between end of question and beginning 
of senders response 
Tempo 
1. Rate of speaking 
2. Rate change 
1. Average number of words per minute 
2. Rate of speaking in the epoch minus the 
average rate of speaking for all responses 
Intensity 
1. Amplitude 
2. Amplitude variety 
1. loudness of senders voice 
2. variation of loudness of a sender’s voice 
Frequency 
1. Pitch 
2. Pitch change 
3. Pitch variety 
1. The average fundamental frequency of 
sender’s voice 
2. variation of pitch of a sender’s voice 
3. Frequency of changes of pitch of a sender’s 
voice 
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*note, the measures Interruptions and Response Latency are not considered due to 
the difficulty in automating these measures. 
 
Moderator 
Proposition 14 from IDT (Buller & Burgoon, 1996, p. 231) states, "Suspicion 
(perceived or actual) increases senders’ (a) strategic and (b) nonstrategic behavior”.  
They stated mixed supporting evidence to which the present study provides an 
opportunity to test this proposition.  Suspicion level is the independent variable (IV) in 
this study but it is also a moderator of the senders’ behavior.  The IV is ordinal and the 
dependent variables (DV) vary in type including categorical, continuous, and ratios.  In 
general, the moderator effect is measured by correlating the independent variable (IV) 
with the dependent variable (DV) (See Table 9 & Table 10) for each state of moderator 
and then testing the difference.  The dyadic circular communication pattern depicted in 
the IDT model (Figure 1 & Figure 3) is very similar to moderator model seen in Figure 4 
below in that the communication is dyadic and circular, providing senders the 
opportunity to change their behavior based on perceived or actual suspicion from the 
receiver.  
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Figure 4, Moderator Model 
The research question (Are speech cues to deceptive behavior moderated over 
time by receiver suspicion during dyadic interactions in a real-world high-stakes 
setting?) required an examination of 41 behavioral cues to deception within four levels of 
suspicion across three levels of granularity of epochs.  So the moderator model was run 
12 different times with repeated measures of the 41 cues taken over time.  At each run in 
an attempt to identify which combination of suspicion and granularity best addresses the 
research question.  The way to measure the moderator effect is to correlate IV with the 
DV separately for each level of suspicion and examine the impact on behavioral cues as 
well as compare between suspicion level impacts (Baron & Kenny 1986).  The following 
sections will describe the data preparation as well as a description of the analysis methods 
utilized. 
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Data Preparation 
The data preparation process followed the steps shown in Figure 5.  First, the raw 
video stored on DVD was processed with Adobe Soundbooth to isolate the audio from 
the video portion; there was no loss of audio data during this step.  The digital audio files 
were then passed through DC Live Forensic 7.5 to improve audibility in preparation for 
segmentation.  Global filters were applied to remove audio signals outside the abilities of 
humans to hear as well as make.  It should be noted that any filters or transformations to 
improve audibility were applied universally.  It should also be noted that all recording 
took place in the same room with the same recording device and same environmental 
settings.  Once global filters removed noise and audibility quality was improved, audio 
was segmented into question/response pairs.   
 
Figure 5, Data Processing Model 
 
The audio data was then duplicated for split processing for the two categories of 
cues, linguistic and paralinguistic.  In preparing the audio for transcription any audio or 
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acoustic filter can be applied that improves transcription accuracy (i.e. pitch, tone, 
cadence, etc. have no impact on linguistic cues).  Identification of which filters to run was 
done by hand.  However, unknown, multi-source, noisy speaker separation and 
transcription research is advancing and many commercial products are available that can 
perform a known, single-source, quiet transcription such as Dragon Naturally Speak tm. 
The goal of processing the data for paralinguistic cue measurement is the removal 
of noise without removing, degrading, or changing the speech signal.  There are several 
techniques for removing and improving clarity of audio however, some can be very 
aggressive and rely on human physical and cognitive audio processing characteristics to 
“trick” the listener into hearing clearer voices (Campbell, 2008; Roweis, 2000; 
Schimmel, Atlas, & Nie, 2007).  This study took a conservative approach to audio filter 
selection to retain as much of the voice signal as possible. 
 
Transcription Automation Difficulties 
The audio data segments then underwent transcription using Docsoft: AV.  
Unfortunately this was very unsuccessful.  Docsoft: AV uses at its’ core a Dragon 
Naturally Speaking voice recognition engine combined with specialized hardware for 
speech capture and transcription (e.g. news and TV broadcasts use similar systems for the 
closed captioning function).  However Dragon’s speech recognition, like almost all 
commercially available transcription systems, is not designed to transcribe multiple 
voices, it is speaker dependent (Transcribing-interview, n.d.).  Unfortunately, interview 
style audio almost always contains multiple speakers (e.g. police interviews) and presents 
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several challenges to transcribers (MacLean, Meyer, & Estable, 2004).  The most 
common solution and the one used in almost every courtroom in the world is called 
“voice writing” (Voice Writer, n.d.).  During voice writing the transcriber repeats the 
words of the subject verbatim, typically into a stenomask to block their own voice from 
being heard and to block outside sounds from being recorded. 
Because the audio for this research comes from a real-world law enforcement 
interview containing multiple speakers on a single channel microphone, automating 
transcriptions is nearly impossible with today’s technology.  Though several interview 
processes were considered that would reduce or remove these barriers (i.e. multiple 
microphones, instruct interviewers to not overlap sender speech), they were left for future 
research when new data can be gathered.  For the present study, voice writing was 
performed to capture the linguistic cues.  The transcript was then manually verified for 
100% accuracy. 
Linguistic cues were measured from the transcript using Structured Programming 
for Linguistic Cue Extraction (SPLICE) and Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) 
software.  Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis (WEKA) (Witten & Frank, 
2000) is used for classification based on the initial text processing steps.  This transcript 
was compared to the law enforcement transcript were ground truth and deceptive 
statements were coded into the full transcript. 
Following processing, linguistic and paralinguistic measures were recombined 
into one data set while maintaining chronological order.  The following section discussed 
several analysis methods that were employed. 
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Analysis Methods 
To better appreciate the difficulty of pursuing multi-method research one must 
realize that over 40 unique approaches to qualitative methods have been identified 
(Tesch, 1990) including ethnography, grounded theory, phenomenology, case study, 
narrative research, and historical research to name a few.  The outcome of qualitative 
studies is what one learns or comes to understand about the phenomenon, organized by 
category or theme (Herndon & Kreps, 2001). 
The purpose of exploratory research is to clarify the research questions that guide 
the entire research project.  This suggests that it precedes some larger more formal (i.e. 
quantitative) research project or stream (Merriam, 1998).  John W. Tukey (1980) strongly 
supported exploratory research stating, “Finding the question is often more important 
than finding the answer”.  Tukey developed one tool called Exploratory Data Analysis 
(EDA) for just that purpose. 
In EDA, like all exploratory tools, the emphasis is on insight and flexibility, in 
contrast to hypothesizing a specific function, estimating factors, and testing for model 
adequacy (Tukey, 1977).  Exploratory data analysis is itself an iterative process.  Its first 
use is to examine the raw data.  This may identify additional aspects of the data which in 
turn encourage further investigation (Kundzewicz & Robson, 2000).  EDA is also a very 
visually-based analysis technique (Jewitt & Leeuwen, 2010) hence the use of graphical 
analysis. 
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From the above, an attempt to clarify the main research question was made by 
exploring narrower sub-questions and reporting insights obtained in a detailed descriptive 
exploratory case study of RWHS deception.  In exploring these sub-questions a mixed 
method approach was utilized in order to maximize the understanding of the phenomenon 
in a very specific environment (Axinn & Pearce, 2006).  In the true nature of exploratory 
research the below method of evaluation (MOE) and measure of performance (MOP) 
were a starting point (Creswell, & Clark, 2007).  Given the limitations of a single case 
study where the unit of analysis is a sub-unit and with the assumption that although the 
unit of analysis comes from the same source, there is some element of independence and 
empirical comparisons are made were possible (Yin, 2009).  The goal of the outcome is 
to offer propositions to stimulate future research about RWHS deception (Saunders, 
Lewis, & Thornhill, 2007).   
RQ:  Are speech cues to deceptive behavior moderated over time by receiver 
suspicion during dyadic interactions in a real-world high-stakes setting? 
What follows are the specific questions, their MOE, and MOP.  MOEs are the 
suggested tools or techniques implemented to investigate the question (Table 11).  
Because this study is exploratory the MOEs may change in response to findings.  MOPs 
are qualitative or quantitative measures of system capabilities or characteristics. 
Table 11, Prospective Analysis Methods 
PROPSITION 
P1:  The difference in speech cues to deceptive behavior will be 
moderated over time by the level of suspicion. 
MOE 
(1) Trend lines with nested base line comparisons (Monmonier, 1990; 
Shumway & Stoffer, 2011); (2) Change-Point Analysis (Yamanishi & 
Takeuchi, 2002). 
MOP (1) Compare slopes of regression lines of different suspicion levels.  
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This is a mixed method approach utilizing the linear regression test 
method in an exploratory manner (i.e. without specifying a specific 
desired significance level). 
(2) Change-point analysis is a powerful tool for determining whether a 
change has taken place.  It is capable of detecting subtle changes 
missed by other methods (Taylor, 2000a & 2000b). 
http://www.variation.com/cpa/tech/changepoint.html. 
PROPSITION 
P1A:  The magnitude of speech cues to deceptive behavior will be 
positively related to an increase in level of suspicion. 
MOE 
(1) Cumulative stacked line charts Ward & Guo, (2011)  ; (2) Change-
Point Analysis (Yamanishi & Takeuchi, 2002); (3) 3-dimentional 
nonlinear smoothers (Conradie, deWet, & Jankowitz, 2009; Díaza, 
Domínguezb, Cuadradoa, & Fuertesb, (2008); (4) Heat maps (Wilknson 
& Friendly, 2009). 
MOP 
(1) Cumulative stacked line charts show the relationship of the parts to 
the whole over time.  Visual analysis will be performed to look for 
changes in cue magnitude; (2) see MOP P1; (3) Inspection of surface 
area of 3D map with Z-score on vertical axis, suspicion on Y axis, and 
epoch on X axis (4) visual inspection of color change. 
PROPSITION 
P1B:  The level of moderation by suspicion will be strongest when 
epochs are at the topic level. 
MOE 
(1) Boxplots (Seo & Shneiderman, 2005), display differences between 
populations without making any assumptions of the underlying 
statistical distribution (i.e. non-parametric).  (2) Tukey's test. 
MOP 
Visual comparisons across minimum, lower quartile, median, upper 
quartile, and maximum; (2) P < 0.10 
PROPSITION 
P2:  Speech cues during deceptive behavior will form identifiable 
patterns that differ from speech cue patterns during truthful behavior. 
MOE 
(1) Scatter Plot Matrices, disaggregated by suspicion (Zhang, 2008); (2) 
data mining, cluster analysis (3) repeated measures ANOVA. 
MOP 
(1) Visual inspection of construct x epoch x z-score; (2)  Compare 
squared Euclidean distance of centroids; (3) t-test. 
PROPSITION 
P2A:  Patterns of speech cues during deceptive behavior will be most 
detectable when epochs are at the topic level. 
MOE Data mining, cluster analysis (Comas, Turmo & Surdeanu, 2008). 
MOP Compare squared Euclidean distance of centroids. 
PROPSITION 
P3:  As the granularity of epochs decreases (epochs gets smaller), the 
number of speech cues to deceptive behavior will increase to an apex 
then decrease. 
MOE 
(1) Trend lines with nested base line comparisons (Shumway & Stoffer, 
2011; Monmonier, 1990). 
MOP 
(1) Compare slopes of regression lines of different granularity levels.  
This is a mixed method approach utilizing the linear regression test 
method in an exploratory manner (i.e. without specifying a specific 
desired significance level). 
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PROPSITION 
P3A:  Speech cues will have the highest correlation with deceptive 
behavior when epochs are at the topic level. 
MOE  Linear regression comparisons Jensen, Lowry, & Jenkins, (2011). 
MOP Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient > .5; R-squared. 
 
Several MOEs are listed above including descriptive statistics, ANOVA, principal 
components analysis, and several different graphical methods.  What follows is a brief 
description of each. 
 
Descriptive Statistics & ANOVA 
Initially the data was examined with descriptive statistics to gain an understanding 
of the range and spread of the data.  According to Trochim, (2000),  
“Descriptive statistics are used to describe the basic features of the data in a study.  
They provide simple summaries about the sample and the measures.  Together 
with simple graphics analysis, they form the basis of virtually every quantitative 
analysis of data.”  
Descriptive statistics provide a valuable means to make initial comparisons across 
the units of analysis.  Almost all published research uses descriptive statistics to some 
degree, deception detection research is no different.  One recent article on deception 
detection which references many of the same theories discussed in this study comes from 
the Journal of Forensic & Investigative Accounting (Cefaratti & Barkhi, 2013).  In which 
the authors use descriptive statistics to describe their sample population and even to lend 
support for their hypotheses.  There are examples of descriptive statistical method used in 
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almost all deception detection research.  The initial analysis method in the current study 
was basic descriptive statistics in the form of box plots and a mean comparison chart.  A 
box plot is a way of graphically depicting numerical data via a five number summary:  
minimum observation, lower quartile, median, upper quartile, and the largest observation.  
Box plots make no statistical distribution assumptions but are good for displaying 
differences between populations.  Box plots can indicate the spread and skewness of data 
as well as identifying possible outliers.  In deception detection research box plots have 
been used to show, very quickly, the lack of significant differences in treatments (Duran, 
Dale, Kello, Street, & Richardson, 2013). 
 
In addition to the box plots for each measure comparing truthful and deceptive 
samples, a table will present the means for each measure and construct (refer to example 
Table 12).  This study makes extensive use of mean tables and frequency distributions, 
again common in deception detection research (Olson, 2013).  The use of ANOVA and 
the various forms of regression are almost expected, even in exploratory research that 
their use should not need justification (Dunbar, Jensen, Bessarabova, Burgoon, Bernard, 
Harrison, & Eckstein, 2012; Fuller, Biros, & Delen, 2011). 
With 41 raw measures across hundreds of question/response pairs, the data set 
contains over 31,000 raw data points.  When multiple epochs, 12 constructs and data 
normalization are considered the data set contains well over 100,000 data points. 
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Table 12, Cue & Conststruct Means Table Format 
Cues 
Mean 
(Raw) 
Mean (Raw w/ Direction) 
Truthful ↕ Deceitful ↕ 
# of Words   ↓  ↑ 
… … …  …  
…  
Constructs 
Mean (Z-Score) 
Truthful ↕ Deceitful ↕ 
Quantity 
 
↓ 
 
↑ 
… … 
 
… 
 
 
Because the DV’s in this study vary in type and scale, a z-score was computed in 
order to make unitless comparisons.  A standard score henceforth referred to as z-scores 
was computed for each cue at each epoch then averaged for each construct at each epoch 
with the following function:  𝑧 =
𝑥−𝜇
𝜎
, where x is a raw score, µ is the mean, and σ is the 
standard deviation.  The z-score is dimensionless with a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of one (Marx & Larsen, 2006). 
 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
One goal of this study is to confirm the constructs used by previous researchers 
when measuring deceptive behavior.  To ensure that the constructs and cues within them 
are measuring what it is believed they should, principle components analysis (PCA) was 
conducted.  PCA has been used in deception detection research on low-quality data 
(Raiman, Hung, & Englebienne, 2011); the current study’s data came from a real-world 
law enforcement interview video tape, not the best quality.  Another benefit of PCA is a 
reduction in dimensionality or factor reduction.  Often one finds that large variances 
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associated with the first k < m principal components, and then a precipitous drop-off 
(Shlens, 2005).  It can be concluded that the most interesting dynamics occur only in the 
first k dimensions.  Therefore the first step of PCA is to identify the components with the 
highest variance utilizing eigenvalues as a cutoff guide. 
The number of components selected was based on their eigenvalue or the percent 
variation explained by the corresponding principal component.  A minimum of 80% of 
the variance explained was selected as a cut point.  Because these components are 
perpendicular to each other they are uncorrelated.  
 
Graphical Analysis 
To help understand and visualize patterns over time a graphical analysis was 
performed.  Implementing data visualization as a means to analyze data is as much an art 
as it is a science (Fayyad, 2002; McBurney & White, 2009).  Several methods were 
explored and those most informative were reported in this study.  For example:  bar 
charts to compare across suspicion levels, line charts or bump charts to visualize trends 
over time, scatter plots to look for clusters and outliers, and moving ranges to find 
patterns. 
 
Figure 6, Example Graphical Analysis Charts 
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Above are only a few preliminary examples; final graphical analysis depended on 
what the data said and how best to display that information.  A final graphical analysis 
method compared the epoch means of various granularities.  Data was segmented into the 
following epoch sizes:  grand means, by topic, by 1.6 hour block, and by 
question/response pairs.  It was believed that the question/response pairs would show the 
most difference between truthful and deceptive measures.  What follows are the results of 
exploring this case study data. 
lxxxvii 
CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter describes the results of the study and methodology established in the 
former chapters.  On the first day, the interview lasted just over four hours and 10 
minutes, during which 711 individual questions were asked covering 209 different topics.   
Due to the methodology of this study and the volume of data analyzed the 
presentation of the results and analysis is a bit unconventional.  First, descriptive statistics 
were generated to describe the basic features of the data including the distribution, central 
tendency, and dispersion.  Analysis of variance was conducted to identify the constructs 
and measurements where there was a significant effect by the level of suspicion.  This 
was followed by regressing the different individual measures of deceptive behavior as 
well as their constructs on to Suspicion for each level of granularity.  Descriptive 
statistics, ANOVA, and regression results are presented in table-form in their entirety so 
they may be referenced.  Next principal components analysis (PCA) was run to validate 
the constructs and to confirm the cues for each construct are measuring the same thing.  
Then, a graphical analysis was run on the data to better understand the relationships 
between levels of Suspicion and measures of deceptive behavior over time.  Finally, the 
results of each proposition are presented.  Again, this way of presentation is done because 
of the exploratory nature of the study and the volume of data analyzed. 
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Descriptive Statistics 
With 70.7% of the measures showing increases during deceptive responses there 
is a general rise in behavior measures (Table 13).  This could be explained by deceiver’s 
tendency to over compensate because he is anxious to appear honest (Boltz, Dyer, & 
Miller, 2010). 
 
Table 13, Descriptive Means of Measures 
Cues 
Mean 
(Raw) 
Mean (Raw w/ Direction) 
Truthful ↕ Deceitful ↕ 
# of Words 43.729 39.253 ↓ 66.429 ↑ 
# of Verbs 3.338 3.000 ↓ 5.038 ↑ 
# of Sentences 8.318 7.418 ↓ 12.829 ↑ 
Sensory ratio 0.790 0.819 ↑ 0.656 ↓ 
Spatial ratio 6.030 6.017 ↓ 6.111 ↑ 
Temporal ratio 4.772 4.711 ↓ 5.150 ↑ 
Content Word Diversity 0.803 0.817 ↑ 0.739 ↓ 
Bilo. Type-Token-Ratio 79.378 80.742 ↑ 73.083 ↓ 
Certainty Terms 3.022 3.037 ↑ 2.914 ↓ 
Tentative Terms 3.111 3.072 ↓ 3.454 ↑ 
Modal Verbs 10.495 10.248 ↓ 11.827 ↑ 
Passive Voice 0.006 0.007 ↑ 0.005 ↓ 
Generalizing Terms 2.331 2.273 ↓ 2.447 ↑ 
Redundancy 18.926 18.667 ↓ 20.323 ↑ 
Sentence Length 12.664 12.532 ↓ 13.495 ↑ 
Complexity Ratio 2.5093 2.5086 ↓ 2.5108 ↑ 
Average Word Length 3.822 3.827 ↑ 3.789 ↓ 
Causation Terms 1.033 0.858 ↓ 1.990 ↑ 
1st person pronouns 9.631 9.368 ↓ 11.294 ↑ 
2nd person pronouns 0.740 0.714 ↓ 0.778 ↑ 
3rd person pronouns 3.031 3.027 ↓ 3.113 ↑ 
Activation 1.595 1.585 ↓ 1.660 ↑ 
Imagery 1.405 1.399 ↓ 1.443 ↑ 
Pleasantness 1.732 1.724 ↓ 1.783 ↑ 
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Cues 
Mean 
(Raw) 
Mean (Raw w/ Direction) 
Truthful ↕ Deceitful ↕ 
Exclusive Verbs 3.137 2.943 ↓ 4.097 ↑ 
Motion Words 2.106 2.042 ↓ 2.506 ↑ 
Cognitive Proc. Terms 16.828 16.390 ↓ 19.250 ↑ 
Non-ah disturbances 2.306 2.195 ↓ 3.051 ↑ 
Speech errors 0.0097 0.0100 ↑ 0.0076 ↓ 
Silent pauses 0.103 0.102 ↓ 0.100 ↓ 
Filled pauses 2.010 2.058 ↑ 1.895 ↓ 
Length of interaction 20.949 19.915 ↓ 26.334 ↑ 
Response length 13.005 11.789 ↓ 19.279 ↑ 
Talking time 13.001 11.784 ↓ 19.275 ↑ 
Rate of speaking 4.940 4.915 ↓ 5.066 ↑ 
Rate change 0.657 0.690 ↑ 0.514 ↓ 
Amplitude 53.727 53.684 ↓ 53.886 ↑ 
Amplitude variety 0.0142 0.0141 ↓ 0.0143 ↑ 
Pitch 135.057 136.465 ↑ 125.577 ↓ 
Pitch change 0.0530 0.0533 ↑ 0.0517 ↓ 
Pitch variety 49.556 49.269 ↓ 51.050 ↑ 
 
The above raw score mean table also gives a good initial understanding of the 
spread of the data.  For example, # of Words averaged just over 43 with truthful 
statements, less at 39 and deceitful statements, and much more at 66 words on average.  
Looking at Construct means requires converting the individual measures to z-scores and 
averaging for each response.  Again, the mean scores for all but three constructs (75%) 
increased during deceitful behavior (Table 14). 
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Table 14, Descriptive Means of Constructs 
Constructs 
Mean = 0 (Z-Score) 
Truthful ↕ Deceitful ↕ 
Quantity -0.096 ↓ 0.483 ↑ 
Specificity 0.068 ↑ -0.312 ↓ 
Uncertainty -0.018 ↓ 0.096 ↑ 
Clarity -0.034 ↓ 0.181 ↑ 
Immediacy -0.028 ↓ 0.151 ↑ 
Affect -0.021 ↓ 0.138 ↑ 
Cognitive Proc. -0.049 ↓ 0.266 ↑ 
Fluency -0.002 ↓ 0.013 ↑ 
Duration -0.077 ↓ 0.398 ↑ 
Tempo 0.022 ↑ -0.081 ↓ 
Intensity -0.013 ↓ 0.048 ↑ 
Frequency 0.013 ↑ -0.102 ↓ 
 
Because all of the constructs are reflective (vs formative) it follows that changes 
in the individual cues reflect the changes in the latent constructs (Coltman, Devinney, 
Midgley, & Venaik, 2008; Petter, Straub, & Rai, 2007). 
Before exploring each proposition, only those measures that showed potential for 
explanatory power were considered.  To address the overarching research question, “Are 
speech cues to deceptive behavior moderated over time by receiver suspicion during 
dyadic interactions in a real-world high-stakes setting?” an ANOVA was run on the 
effect of suspicion on the measures to determine which cues are showing deceptive 
behavior.   
ANOVA 
An initial step to reporting ANOVA results should be to define what is “extreme”.  
In other words, what is the cutoff value of α level of significance given the nature of the 
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study.  Most linguistic and psycholinguistic as well as MIS journals enforce the 
conventional α of 0.05 (Baayen 2008, p 68).  Because of the exploratory nature of this 
study Type II errors (failing to reject when the null hypothesis is in fact false) are more 
acceptable than Type I (rejecting the null hypothesis when in fact it is true).  In practical 
terms, believing a treatment has an effect when in fact there is none (Type II error) is less 
damaging than dismissing a treatment that in fact has an effect (Type I error) (Murphy, 
Myors, & Wolach, 2009).  Furthermore, given the uncontrolled environment from which 
the data was collected, a more relaxed α of 0.10 is adopted.  Where α levels of greater 
significance are noticed, they are reported.  What follows in Table 15 are the ANOVA 
statistics on the individual measures z-score data. 
 
Table 15, ANOVA of Suspicion on Individual Measures by Granularity 
CONSTRUCT MEASURES 
Q/R Pairs Topic 1.6Hr Blocks 
F3, 707 Sig. F Sig. F Sig. 
Quantity 
WordCount 9.64 0.000 1.22 0.192 2.88 0.035 
NumSentences 14.01 0.000 2.14 0.000 13.02 0.000 
NumVerbs 8.33 0.000 1.22 0.198 4.27 0.005 
Specificity 
SensoryRatio 0.37 0.778 0.69 0.892 1.17 0.320 
SpatialRatio 0.02 0.995 1.04 0.410 1.75 0.155 
TemporalRatio 0.41 0.744 0.99 0.490 0.21 0.889 
ContentWordDiversity 10.09 0.000 1.38 0.087 3.32 0.020 
BiloTTR 9.15 0.000 1.31 0.129 1.90 0.128 
Uncertainty 
CertaintyTerms 0.24 0.869 0.92 0.587 0.40 0.754 
TentativeTerms 0.51 0.674 0.73 0.849 1.05 0.371 
ModalVerbs 1.24 0.293 1.08 0.360 0.25 0.863 
PassiveVoice 0.33 0.801 0.50 0.988 0.59 0.624 
GeneralizingTerms 1.10 0.348 1.31 0.127 2.11 0.098 
Clarity 
Redundancy 1.05 0.370 1.15 0.262 0.48 0.695 
SentenceLength 0.68 0.563 0.62 0.947 5.22 0.001 
ComplexityRatio 0.06 0.983 1.72 0.010 1.53 0.204 
AvgWordLength 0.29 0.835 1.97 0.002 2.66 0.048 
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CONSTRUCT MEASURES 
Q/R Pairs Topic 1.6Hr Blocks 
F3, 707 Sig. F Sig. F Sig. 
CausationTerms 6.33 0.000 1.68 0.013 0.88 0.452 
Immediacy 
1stppronoun 3.28 0.021 1.37 0.090 1.43 0.233 
2ndppronoun 0.95 0.414 1.51 0.040 1.01 0.387 
3rdppronoun 0.06 0.982 2.41 0.000 2.38 0.069 
Affect 
ActivationScore 1.48 0.219 1.20 0.214 1.60 0.187 
ImageryScore 0.40 0.755 1.32 0.122 2.01 0.111 
PleasantnessScore 0.73 0.536 1.16 0.253 0.72 0.540 
Cognitive Processing 
ExclusiveVerbs 1.95 0.121 1.13 0.286 0.28 0.839 
MotionWords 0.50 0.679 1.67 0.014 3.01 0.029 
CogProcTerms 1.76 0.154 1.16 0.256 1.01 0.387 
Fluency 
NonAhDisturbances 2.11 0.098 1.30 0.132 0.36 0.782 
SpeechErrors 0.35 0.788 0.90 0.619 0.09 0.967 
SilentPauses 1.27 0.283 2.37 0.000 20.51 0.000 
FilledPauses 0.43 0.734 0.98 0.499 1.12 0.338 
Time-Duration 
LengthOfInteraction 1.03 0.378 0.44 0.997 2.16 0.092 
ResponseLength 8.97 0.000 1.13 0.289 4.35 0.005 
TalkingTime 8.99 0.000 1.13 0.287 4.35 0.005 
Time-Tempo 
RateOfSpeaking 0.92 0.433 1.21 0.205 11.67 0.000 
RateChange 2.89 0.035 1.00 0.469 1.50 0.213 
Intensity 
AmpMeandB 0.75 0.520 2.40 0.000 5.77 0.001 
AmpVarietyPascals 0.60 0.616 2.27 0.000 2.97 0.031 
Frequency 
PitchHz 3.41 0.017 1.11 0.312 0.64 0.587 
PitchChange 0.74 0.527 1.64 0.018 0.78 0.504 
PitchVariety 1.53 0.206 1.26 0.165 4.37 0.005 
# of Significant Measures 12 13 17 
% of Significant Measures 29.3% 31.7% 41.5% 
 
There was a significant effect of Suspicion on 12 measures of behavior namely 
WordCount, NumSentances, and NumVerbs, ContentWordDiversity, BiloTTR, 
CausationTerms, 1stppronoun, NonAhDisturbances, ResponseLength, TalkingTime, 
RateChange, and PitchHz (2.89 < F3, 707 > 14.01, p < .035).  The measure of Cognitive 
Processing, ExclusiveVerbs, was close to being significant (F3, 707 = 1.98, p =0.121).  All 
13 measures were included in further analysis to see if patterns could be identified. 
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In order to run the ANOVA on the constructs the data required manipulation so 
the aggregate of the different measures could be computed.  All measures were given a z-
score, the minimum score in a range was found and added back onto each individual 
measure.  This generated a positive scale across individual measures allowing for a 
meaningful average for each construct for each level of granularity. 
Table 16, ANOVA of Suspicion on Constructs by Granularity 
CONSTRUCTS 
By QR Pairs By Topic 
By 1.6 Hr 
Blocks 
F3, 707 Sig. F3, 707 Sig. F3, 707 Sig. 
Quantity 11.567 .000 1.527 .037 5.981 .000 
Specificity 5.932 .001 1.440 .062 3.918 .009 
Uncertainty .839 .473 .621 .945 .031 .993 
Clarity 1.967 .118 1.208 .207 2.557 .054 
Immediacy 1.015 .386 1.858 .004 2.370 .069 
Affect .915 .433 1.222 .194 1.473 .221 
Cognitive Processing 3.138 .025 1.478 .049 .736 .531 
Fluency .705 .549 1.494 .045 7.470 .000 
Time Duration 7.456 .000 1.131 .289 4.809 .003 
Time Tempo .922 .430 1.690 .013 25.530 .000 
Intensity .659 .578 2.372 .000 4.376 .005 
Frequency .684 .562 1.474 .050 .947 .417 
# of Sig. Measures 4 8 8 
% of Sig. Measures 33.3% 50% 50% 
 
As seen in Table 16, there was a significant effect of Suspicion on four constructs 
by QR Pairs, eight by topic, and eight by 1.6 Hr Blocks (1.46 < F3, 707 > 25.530, p < .055).  
The construct Clarity by QR Pairs, was close to being significant (F3, 707 = 1.98, p 
=0.118).  10 of the 12 Constructs are included in further analysis to see if patterns can be 
identified; the two that were omitted are Uncertainty and Affect due to their lack of 
significance. 
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There was a significant effect of Suspicion on behavioral measures when 
combined into a single mode Linguistics for both QR Pairs and topic level of granularity 
(1.710 < F3, 707 > 4.653, p < .011).  However, the Paralinguistic mode was effected by 
Suspicion at all three levels of granularity (3.277 < F3, 707 > 4.673, p < .021). 
 
Table 17, ANOVA of Suspicion on Modes by Granularity 
Modes QR Pairs Topic 1.6 Hr Blocks 
 
F Sig. F Sig. F Sig. 
Linguistic 4.653 .003 1.710 .011 .107 .956 
Paralinguistic 3.277 .021 1.690 .013 4.673 .003 
  
It appears that ANOVA provides strong support for the primary research question.  
Not only do ~32% of the individual cues measured show a significant effect of Suspicion 
but 10 of 12 constructs showed some degree of effect of Suspicion. 
 
Regression 
Regressing the behavioral measures on to the levels of Suspicion was also run in 
order to show how the dependent variable changes with respect to the independent 
variable.  What follows is a regression of the individual measures and the constructs onto 
Suspicion to better understand the relationship between these variables.  The intent of 
both ANOVA and regression are to identify those measures and constructs that warrant 
further analysis. 
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Table 18, Regression on Mode by Granularity 
  
 
Table 18 shows that both linguistic and paralinguistic has a significant effect 
across almost all levels of granularity.  However, the percentage of variance explained 
was extremely low.  This would suggest that with additional data sets or when examined 
in a controlled environment these modes could be fruitful. 
Table 19 also shows a significant effect across constructs by level of granularity 
with 50% being significant.  Again the percentage of variance explained is extremely 
small.  It can be argued that a small but reliable relationship in a real-world deception 
detection setting where no controls are in place is still valuable. 
Table 19, Regression on Constructs by Granularity 
  
 
Dependent Variable Predictors R R^2 P-Value
QRSUSP 0.115 0.013 0.002
TOPICSUSP 0.063 0.004 0.092
1.6HRSUSP 0.005 0.000 0.893
QRSUSP 0.089 0.008 0.018
TOPICSUSP 0.085 0.007 0.023
1.6HRSUSP 0.092 0.008 0.015
Linguistics
Paralinguistics
Dependent Variable IV R R^2 P-Value IV R R^2 P-Value IV R R^2 P-Value
Quantity 0.200 0.040 0.000 0.150 0.022 0.000 0.100 0.010 0.008
Specificity 0.139 0.019 0.000 0.114 0.013 0.002 0.093 0.009 0.013
Uncertainty 0.030 0.001 0.419 0.044 0.002 0.237 0.002 0.000 0.959
Clarity 0.065 0.004 0.085 0.005 0.000 0.901 0.086 0.007 0.022
Immediacy 0.065 0.004 0.081 0.095 0.009 0.011 0.053 0.003 0.160
Affect 0.057 0.003 0.131 0.015 0.000 0.692 0.046 0.002 0.221
Cognitive Processing 0.105 0.011 0.005 0.078 0.006 0.037 0.049 0.002 0.194
Fluency 0.006 0.000 0.870 0.012 0.000 0.741 0.140 0.020 0.000
Time Duration 0.162 0.026 0.000 0.101 0.010 0.007 0.076 0.006 0.044
Time Tempo 0.045 0.002 0.234 0.003 0.000 0.937 0.300 0.090 0.000
Intensity 0.015 0.000 0.682 0.023 0.001 0.537 0.130 0.017 0.001
Frequency 0.035 0.001 0.346 0.005 0.000 0.887 0.053 0.003 0.156
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When regressing individual measures by level of granularity a pattern of 
increasing percentage of variance explained becomes evident as the dependent variable 
goes from mode to construct to measure. 
Table 20, Regression on Measures by Granularity 
 
 
Dependent Variable IV R R^2 P-Value IV R R^2 P-Value IV R R^2 P-Value
WC 0.181 0.033 0.000 0.122 0.015 0.001 0.043 0.002 0.252
NumSentences 0.223 0.050 0.000 0.186 0.034 0.000 0.192 0.037 0.000
NumVerbs 0.170 0.029 0.000 0.121 0.015 0.001 0.051 0.003 0.173
SensoryRatio 0.033 0.001 0.381 0.015 0.000 0.695 0.050 0.003 0.181
SpatialRatio 0.002 0.000 0.963 0.032 0.001 0.393 0.085 0.007 0.024
TemporalRatio 0.014 0.000 0.702 0.009 0.000 0.817 0.025 0.001 0.505
ContentWordDiversity 0.182 0.033 0.000 0.134 0.018 0.000 0.052 0.003 0.165
BiloTTR 0.169 0.029 0.000 0.129 0.017 0.001 0.034 0.001 0.370
CertaintyTerms 0.011 0.000 0.778 0.030 0.001 0.426 0.020 0.000 0.589
TentativeTerms 0.017 0.000 0.654 0.004 0.000 0.925 0.027 0.001 0.469
ModalVerbs 0.072 0.005 0.054 0.057 0.003 0.132 0.002 0.000 0.952
PassiveVoice 0.022 0.000 0.554 0.018 0.000 0.636 0.017 0.000 0.648
GeneralizingTerms 0.013 0.000 0.737 0.028 0.001 0.451 0.033 0.001 0.387
Redundancy 0.042 0.002 0.262 0.004 0.000 0.915 0.001 0.000 0.968
SentenceLength 0.024 0.001 0.522 0.008 0.000 0.822 0.147 0.022 0.000
ComplexityRatio 0.001 0.000 0.988 0.033 0.001 0.385 0.018 0.000 0.624
AvgWordLength 0.031 0.001 0.409 0.059 0.003 0.116 0.056 0.003 0.139
CausationTerms 0.150 0.023 0.000 0.083 0.007 0.028 0.028 0.001 0.458
1stppronoun 0.099 0.010 0.009 0.075 0.006 0.045 0.069 0.005 0.065
2ndppronoun 0.006 0.000 0.883 0.089 0.008 0.018 0.035 0.001 0.358
3rdppronoun 0.002 0.000 0.959 0.010 0.000 0.787 0.051 0.003 0.176
ActivationScore 0.073 0.005 0.052 0.009 0.000 0.801 0.069 0.005 0.067
ImageryScore 0.039 0.002 0.302 0.020 0.000 0.588 0.029 0.001 0.447
PleasantnessScore 0.046 0.002 0.219 0.012 0.000 0.758 0.031 0.001 0.414
ExclusiveVerbs 0.084 0.007 0.024 0.052 0.003 0.167 0.034 0.001 0.368
MotionWords 0.041 0.002 0.271 0.019 0.000 0.605 0.041 0.002 0.277
CogProcTerms 0.069 0.005 0.064 0.074 0.005 0.049 0.016 0.000 0.670
NonAhDisturbances 0.056 0.003 0.137 0.062 0.004 0.099 0.036 0.001 0.344
SpeechErrors 0.033 0.001 0.374 0.029 0.001 0.441 0.007 0.000 0.862
SilentPauses 0.018 0.000 0.639 0.021 0.000 0.568 0.213 0.045 0.000
FilledPauses 0.018 0.000 0.639 0.014 0.000 0.704 0.035 0.001 0.346
LengthOfInteraction 0.060 0.004 0.109 0.034 0.001 0.361 0.037 0.001 0.322
ResponseLength 0.178 0.032 0.000 0.112 0.013 0.003 0.079 0.006 0.036
TalkingTime 0.178 0.032 0.000 0.113 0.013 0.003 0.078 0.006 0.037
RateOfSpeaking 0.053 0.003 0.160 0.028 0.001 0.453 0.209 0.044 0.000
RateChange 0.095 0.009 0.011 0.031 0.001 0.409 0.077 0.006 0.041
AmpMeandB 0.024 0.001 0.515 0.021 0.000 0.582 0.149 0.022 0.000
AmpVarietyPascals 0.006 0.000 0.875 0.025 0.001 0.505 0.108 0.012 0.004
PitchHz 0.101 0.010 0.007 0.043 0.002 0.250 0.043 0.002 0.255
PitchChange 0.054 0.003 0.153 0.026 0.001 0.483 0.035 0.001 0.358
PitchVariety 0.079 0.006 0.034 0.081 0.007 0.031 0.122 0.015 0.001
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Both ANOVA and regression examinations provide evidence that further analysis 
is warranted on the following:  modes (linguistic & paralinguistic), constructs (Quantity, 
Specificity, Clarity, Immediacy, Cognitive Processing, Time-Duration, and Time-
Tempo), and significant Measures in Table 20 above.  
Next, PCA was run to test the degree to which the measures within the constructs 
have a single dimension; in other words, are the cues measuring the same construct and 
only that construct. 
 
Principal Components Analysis 
A PCA was run not only on the measures but on the constructs in the hopes to 
better understand the measures of each and to see if the constructs used by previous 
researchers (Fuller et al., 2009; Meservy 2007) held up in a RWHS case.  PCA provides a 
method to reduce a complex data set to one of lower dimensionality to potentially reveal 
any hidden, simplified structures. 
The number of components to extract was determined first by looking at 
eigenvalues greater than one in a Scree Plot (Figure 7). 
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Figure 7, Scree Plot 
 
The Scree Plot shows 14 components with eigenvalues greater than one.  It is 
noted there appears to be a drop after seven components which may be a better number of 
components to extract.  14 components were fixed in the following PCA and special 
attention given to the first seven components if their cumulative variance explained is 
noteworthy. 
A KMO Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was run to test whether a PCA is worthwhile 
in the first place.  In order to proceed, Bartlett’s Test should be significant and the PCA 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy should be > 0.5. 
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KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .727 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 26520.117 
Df 820 
Sig. .000 
Figure 8, KMO & Bartlett's Test 
 
As seen in Figure 8, the KMO test was significant and the Sampling Adequacy 
was 0.727, well above the common 0.5 accepted standard. 
Communalities were also run which represent the percent of variance that is being 
accounted for by the components analysis for each factor.  There is no standard 
percentage that is too low but for the current study 0.25 would be considered low.  In 
Table 21, none of the factor communalities are below 0.25, in fact most are very high. 
Table 21, PCA Communalities 
Communalities 
Extraction Extraction Extraction 
WC .952 SentenceLength .520 SpeechErrors .821 
NumSentences .801 ComplexityRatio .902 SilentPauses .566 
NumVerbs .918 AvgWordLength .909 FilledPauses .523 
SensoryRatio .701 CausationTerms .675 LengthOfInteraction .333 
SpatialRatio .581 1stppronoun .632 ResponseLength .957 
TemporalRatio .654 2ndppronoun .614 TalkingTime .958 
ContentWordDiversity .857 3rdppronoun .338 RateOfSpeaking .703 
BiloTTR .807 ActivationScore .874 RateChange .707 
CertaintyTerms .775 ImageryScore .803 AmpMeandB .928 
TentativeTerms .613 PleasantnessScore .855 AmpVarietyPascals .857 
ModalVerbs .605 ExclusiveVerbs .652 PitchHz .643 
PassiveVoice .669 MotionWords .590 PitchChange .783 
GeneralizingTerms .497 CogProcTerms .857 PitchVariety .340 
Redundancy .609 NonAhDisturbances .506 
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Because the measures are believed to be correlated a Direct Oblimin rotation was 
used.  The Direct Oblimin is an approach to producing an oblique factor rotation, which 
means the factors can be correlated with each other. 
If the factor solution that is the most appropriate in an orthogonal uncorrelated 
factor solution then the Direct Oblimin factor rotation procedure will yield a more or less 
orthogonal factor solution.  Normally, there will be some correlation between factors in 
any real world examination, especially the current study, and Direct Oblimin will 
estimate those correlations.  In other words, the best of both orthogonal and oblique 
rotation procedures are recognized. 
Table 22, PCA Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation 
Sums of 
Squared 
Loadings 
 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total 
1 7.403 18.056 18.056 7.403 18.056 18.056 6.748 
2 3.664 8.937 26.993 3.664 8.937 26.993 3.698 
3 2.499 6.095 33.089 2.499 6.095 33.089 2.217 
4 2.171 5.295 38.384 2.171 5.295 38.384 3.234 
5 1.853 4.520 42.903 1.853 4.520 42.903 1.644 
6 1.636 3.991 46.895 1.636 3.991 46.895 1.442 
7 1.576 3.844 50.738 1.576 3.844 50.738 2.932 
8 1.369 3.340 54.078 1.369 3.340 54.078 1.916 
9 1.236 3.014 57.092 1.236 3.014 57.092 1.696 
10 1.201 2.930 60.023 1.201 2.930 60.023 1.258 
11 1.125 2.743 62.766 1.125 2.743 62.766 1.568 
12 1.106 2.696 65.462 1.106 2.696 65.462 1.247 
13 1.037 2.530 67.992 1.037 2.530 67.992 1.188 
14 1.011 2.465 70.457 1.011 2.465 70.457 1.265 
… 
       
41 .000 .000 100.000 
    
Extraction Method:  Principal Component Analysis. 
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With 14 components 70.457% of the variance is explained (Table 22).  Given the 
nature of the study and the large number of measures taken (41) this is a respectable 
reduction of factors and percent of variance explained. 
What follows is the Pattern Matrix (Table 23) with absolute values < 0.3 subdued 
to help identify the nature of the components.  Additionally PCA was run on the 
Constructs and their Pattern Matrix is on the right side of the table. 
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Table 23, PCA Pattern Matrix 
 
For the Construct PCA the KMO was significant at 0.000 and Sampling 
Adequacy of 0.638.  The Communalities ranged from 0.452 - 0.887 and the total variance 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 1 2 3 4 5
WC .974 .018 .012 .037 -.031 -.048 .041 .011 .035 .019 .023 .012 .008 .027
NumSentences .898 .044 .080 -.081 -.011 .124 .029 -.052 .000 .034 -.042 -.014 .021 .073
NumVerbs .959 .013 -.009 .022 .019 -.034 .054 .017 .023 .015 .044 .020 .013 .027
SensoryRatio -.015 -.026 .046 .042 .139 -.210 .172 -.026 -.049 .084 .003 .172 .717 .250
SpatialRatio .092 .259 -.045 .065 -.615 .059 .279 -.066 .014 .060 -.094 -.115 -.079 -.106
TemporalRatio -.006 .063 .046 .015 -.109 -.049 -.221 -.197 .734 -.082 -.107 .139 .008 .143
ContentWordDiversity -.764 -.007 .076 -.084 -.090 .111 .134 -.024 .020 .289 -.072 .001 -.008 .080
BiloTTR -.730 .024 .047 -.076 -.120 .106 .138 .013 .040 .329 -.078 .046 .003 .069
CertaintyTerms .000 -.318 .137 -.083 .092 .127 .168 .033 .712 .105 .049 -.080 -.058 .023
TentativeTerms -.035 .034 .090 -.041 -.042 .107 -.039 .747 -.031 -.120 -.039 -.060 .074 -.049
ModalVerbs .089 .303 -.096 .085 .643 .030 -.062 -.017 .021 .083 -.147 -.158 -.025 -.087
PassiveVoice .028 -.048 .003 -.063 -.111 .360 -.188 .005 -.025 -.089 .052 -.147 .651 -.227
GeneralizingTerms -.036 .048 .133 .049 -.009 -.009 -.171 .290 -.098 .042 -.026 -.482 -.016 .316
Redundancy .129 .235 -.125 .040 -.513 -.062 -.339 .098 .034 .072 .151 .010 -.031 -.088
SentenceLength .302 .066 -.086 .247 -.019 -.374 -.142 .154 .091 -.038 .143 .050 -.006 -.085
ComplexityRatio .068 .202 .892 .091 -.014 -.029 -.038 .073 .104 .062 -.015 -.057 .045 -.040
AvgWordLength .035 .092 .932 .073 -.022 -.027 .069 .031 .078 .053 -.053 -.151 .039 -.022
CausationTerms .002 -.035 .028 -.001 .127 -.010 .018 .010 .000 .032 .808 .102 -.014 .054
1stppronoun .047 .358 -.236 .024 .536 .101 .023 -.046 .029 .047 .169 -.101 -.067 -.237
2ndppronoun .065 .119 -.104 .056 -.037 .016 -.007 -.061 .115 -.072 .036 -.029 .023 .772
3rdppronoun .084 -.079 .128 -.038 .045 -.493 -.037 -.021 -.243 .060 .009 .037 -.019 .025
ActivationScore .002 .902 .045 .024 .082 .077 -.027 .078 -.045 -.028 .041 .064 -.008 .037
ImageryScore -.015 .818 .187 .010 -.121 -.027 -.107 -.080 -.087 .114 .070 -.012 .026 .048
PleasantnessScore .010 .907 .086 -.014 .049 .028 .008 .071 -.018 -.097 .020 .055 -.022 .076
ExclusiveVerbs .015 .023 -.051 .024 -.021 -.101 .017 .775 -.053 .036 -.043 .201 -.074 -.003
MotionWords .032 .130 -.073 .055 -.250 .014 .032 -.101 -.032 .038 .654 -.156 .067 .011
CogProcTerms .072 -.118 .104 -.096 .187 .111 .075 .498 .618 .101 .212 -.063 -.062 -.068
NonAhDisturbances -.016 -.018 .449 -.077 -.031 .022 -.111 -.081 -.069 -.239 .103 .312 -.151 -.220
SpeechErrors .048 .009 -.043 .005 -.022 .064 .093 .069 -.004 -.910 -.072 -.076 .002 .095
SilentPauses .097 .025 .051 .259 .114 .648 .106 .040 -.114 .016 -.010 .156 .001 .058
FilledPauses -.015 .072 -.055 .055 -.075 .035 .019 .190 .018 .065 -.005 .695 .009 .044
LengthOfInteraction .462 -.193 -.057 .030 -.076 .176 -.079 -.007 -.068 .172 -.077 -.027 -.024 -.038
ResponseLength .984 .025 .057 -.056 -.029 -.041 .024 .006 .020 .024 .010 .018 -.004 .027
TalkingTime .984 .025 .057 -.056 -.029 -.041 .024 .006 .020 .024 .010 .018 -.005 .027
RateOfSpeaking .050 .006 .059 -.064 .074 -.077 -.807 .000 .013 .033 -.028 -.056 .041 -.022
RateChange .009 -.039 .041 -.197 -.028 .033 .796 -.022 -.054 -.020 .014 .025 .049 -.031
AmpMeandB -.015 -.046 .056 .954 .028 .185 -.023 -.017 -.067 -.004 .036 .012 -.037 .110
AmpVarietyPascals -.004 -.087 .074 .893 .021 .228 -.103 -.039 -.106 .003 .057 .032 -.072 .134
PitchHz -.066 -.191 .060 -.444 .035 .251 .003 -.098 -.188 -.003 .056 -.015 -.259 .309
PitchChange .030 -.112 -.002 -.749 .040 .250 -.028 -.017 -.108 -.002 .026 .046 -.121 .189
PitchVariety .191 .151 .011 -.162 .086 .164 -.263 .018 -.045 .037 -.042 .292 .092 .068
-.147-.125-.670.081 .205
Pattern Matrix
-.068.205.076-.659-.006
.079 .763 -.039 .113 .053
.903.017-.102-.025.053
.935 .000 .030 -.029 -.047
.287.760.103.086-.083
.041 -.026 .783 .014 -.024
.202.399.438.087.135
.109 -.056 -.204 .704 -.295
-.087.032.026.009-.738
-.012 -.015 .745 -.116 -.088
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.933 .028 .042 .035 -.043
Time-Tempo
Intensity
Component
Quantity
Specificity
Undertainty
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T
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Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization
Clarity
Immediacy
Affect
Cognitive 
Processing
Fluency
Time-Duration
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explained by five components was 64.881%.  Finally the largest Component Correlation 
Matric value was 0.172 showing little correlation between components. 
There are several very strong constructs identified in the Pattern Matrix which are 
discussed, namely components 1-4, 7 and 10.  The remaining constructs explain a fair 
amount of variance but do not seem to fall into a logical pattern.  Component one of the 
Measures PCA encompasses all the Quantity and Time-Duration measures and could be 
described collectively as Amount with a negative correlation with Content Word 
Diversity and Bilo Type Token Ratio.  This would indicate that as the amount of speech 
generated increased the diversity and variety of linguistics decreased at the same time.  
Next, Component two seems to center on the Affect construct with minor impact from 
other measures so its measures of impact and emotion seems to correlate well and of 
equal strength.  The third Component contains two strong measures from the Clarity 
Construct, Complexity Ration and Average Word Length and NonAhDisturbances from 
the Fluency Construct.  This component seems to show a pattern of increased complexity 
paired with an increase in fluidity of speech.  This could be described as Confidence in 
the subjects’ speech behavior.  Component four is composed of four paralinguistic 
measures of amplitude and frequency and could best be described as Voice Propagation.  
This is a very logical connection and would seem to suggest that the constructs Intensity 
and Frequency should be combined in future studies.  The final two components of 
interest are #7 and #10.  Component seven is primarily made up of the Time-Tempo 
construct measures as is best described as such.  Finally, Component 10 has several 
contributing measures but none as strong as SpeechErrors (negatively).  In future 
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research perhaps the Construct Fluency could be measured by counting speech errors 
alone. 
If an information technology tool was built on the smallest set of measures the 
constructs Quantity, Affect, Intensity, and Time-Duration seem to score well on the PCA; 
these cues would also be easy to measure with existing technology. 
 
Propositions 
Next the results and analysis of each proposition will be discussed.  References to 
the above descriptive statistics, ANOVA, and regression tables will be made along with 
other pertinent methods like PCA and graphical analysis as evidences for their support. 
P1:  The difference in speech cues to deceptive behavior will be moderated over 
time by the level of suspicion. 
Supported:  Considering the mean scores from the descriptive statistics Table 13 
and categorizing them by suspicion level, by time (quartiles) results in Figure 9 below.  
Behavioral scores from beginning to end changed and they changed more drastically for 
deception than for truth.  The choice of quartiles was because the individual units of time 
between question and response pairs differed. 
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Figure 9, Z-Score by Suspicion by Quartile 
The above chart shows the actual z-scores but is difficult to interpret or see the 
differences.  Therefore, the scores were adjusted to have a common starting point to make 
their slope difference more apparent. 
 
Figure 10, Adjusted Z-Score by Quartile 
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The z-scores for each level of suspicion were adjusted so they all start at zero but 
maintain their slope.  This clearly shows that scores for truthful statements tended to 
decrease overtime while deceptive statements increased.  It should be noted that these 
charts looked at all measures, not just the significant ones in the ANOVA Table 15.  If 
only the significant measures from ANOVA Table 15 are used the difference over time 
becomes even more noticeable (Figure 11).   
 
Figure 11, Z-Score of Significant Measures by Quartile 
Though still small, the slopes change over time even more so; this is to be 
expected, but makes the differences easier to see. 
P1A:  The magnitude of speech cues to deceptive behavior will be positively 
related to an increase in level of suspicion. 
Supported:  The magnitude of deceptive behavioral cues increased as suspicion 
increased.  One concern is the drop from w/ Evidence to Lie which should be looked at in 
future research. 
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Figure 12 – Figure 15 examine the significant constructs of Quantity, Specificity, 
Cognitive Processing, and Time-Duration looking at average cue scores across the four 
levels of suspicion.  All scores in these charts are z-scores to enable direct comparisons. 
 
Figure 12, Quantity 
The average magnitude for cues in the Quantity construct clearly increase as 
Suspicion increases from Truth to Deception.  However, the differences within the 
degrees of evidence are not clearly increasing.  This may not be of concern with the 
exception of the w/o Evidence deception scores.  One explanation for this maybe that the 
w/o Evidence level of suspicion had a very small sample size. 
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Figure 13, Time-Duration 
 
The scores for Quantity and Time-Duration construct measures mirror each other.  
This is to be expected, the more the subject says the longer it takes.  Again, the 
magnitude of each cue increases as Suspicion moves from Truth to Deception. 
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Figure 14, Specificity 
Only two measures of Specificity, Content Diversity and BiloTTR significantly 
contributed to this construct with a decrease in average z-score magnitude as Suspicion 
moved from Truth to Deception. 
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Figure 15, Cognitive Processing 
 
The Cognitive Processing construct measures are not as consistent across levels of 
suspicion as the other significant constructs.  Again, the w/o Evidence Suspicion level 
data may be skewed due to small sample size.  The following charts consider the average 
z-scores for individual measures. 
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Figure 16, P1A - Q/R Level - All 
Figure 16 shows all measures with a significant increase in z-score by level of 
suspicion.  To better evaluate the magnitude Figure 17 shows only z-scores for significant 
measures from Table 20, Regression on Measures by Granularity, which is at Q/R Level. 
 
Figure 17, P1A - Q/R Level - Regression Significant Measures 
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P1B:  The level of moderation by suspicion will be most detectable when epochs 
are at the topic level. 
Opposite Supported:  The opposite of this proposition was measured.  When 
considering all behavioral cues as a single measure the highest variance explained 
occurred when looking at a granularity of 1.6 hrs and the lowest during topic level.  To 
test if suspicion predicts behavior across different levels of epoch look at Table 20, 
Regression on Measures by Granularity, and count the number of behavioral cues which 
are significant at each level.  The results are inconclusive at 16 significant measures by 
Q/R pairs, and 13 by both topic level and 1.6 Hr blocks. 
 
Figure 18, P1B - All 
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The following figure then considered modality to see if the strength of the 
relationship between IV and DV was strongest at the topic level, again it was not.
 
Figure 19, P1B - Mode 
Finally, each significant construct was considered and the strength of the IV DV 
relationship for each was compared.  Again, topic level granularity is not the strongest. 
 
Figure 20, P1B - Construct 
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Though the behavior of the cues across different epochs is easy to observe, 
without additional data sets this proposition cannot be proven. 
 
P2:  Speech cues during deceptive behavior will form identifiable patterns that 
differ from speech cue patterns during truthful behavior. 
From the descriptive statistics a general pattern appears; over 70% of the 
individual measures increased during deception (Table 13).  The same general patterns 
hold when looking at Constructs, the mean scores for all but three constructs (75%) 
increased during deceitful behavior (Table 14). 
Cluster analysis results were not conclusive.  The matrix scatter plot of the 
significant constructs show dispersion in all but Quantity vs Time Duration.  It is logical 
for these two constructs to be linearly correlated; as the quantity of words, verb, and 
sentences increases so does the amount of time to say those words. 
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Figure 21, Cluster Matrix 
 
Graphical analysis revealed promising results.  Figure 22 through Figure 25 show 
a comparison of truths (blue) to lies (red) over time for three constructs and both modes 
(the remaining construct graphs can be found in Appendix B). 
Quantity
Time Duration
Cognitive Processing
Specificity
Q-S Q - C Q - T
S - C S - T
C - T
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Figure 22, Word Count 
 
Figure 22 shows how Word Count decreases almost uniformly regardless of level 
of suspicion.  One explanation for this pattern could be fatigue (Ramdharry, Thornhill, 
Mein, Reilly, & Marsden, 2012).  After four hours the subject could just be tired of 
talking.  However, there is a stark difference in the number of words spoken when 
comparing truthful vs deceptive patterns which stay relatively constant, a pattern in and 
of itself. 
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Figure 23, Causation Terms 
 
In comparison to Word Count, the Causation Terms construct shows a relative 
constant truthful behavior while behavior measures during deception increases overtime.  
One explanation for this pattern could be overcompensation continuously during attempts 
to deceive (ten Brinke, 2012; Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Fisher, 2010). 
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Figure 24, NonAhDisturbances 
 
Similar to the Causation Terms constructs, the NonAhDisturbances construct 
shows consistent scores during truthful behavior.  However deceptive behavior resulted 
in a slight decrease in the number of NonAhDisturbances.  During a long interview the 
subject could become more comfortable in his deception resulting in a more fluid speech 
(Hu, Chen, & Fu, 2012).  However this change is very slight and without additional 
subjects to test this could be just a chance occurrence. 
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Figure 25, Linguistic & Paralinguistic 
 
The final trend line graph compares overall behavior scores for linguistic and 
paralinguistic modes throughout the interview (Figure 25).  Overall linguistic behavior 
scores, though slightly elevated during deception were relatively constant.  There appears 
to be no support to looking at all linguistic cues when they are combined together.  For 
the paralinguistic mode, scores trend downward (i.e. possible fatigue) but deceptive 
scores decrease more quickly. 
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P2A: Patterns of speech cues during deceptive behavior will be most detectable 
when epochs are at the topic level. 
Not Supported:  Though identifiable patterns of speech cues during deceptive 
behavior were substantiated, no support could be found that would suggest these 
patterns were more detectable at the topic level.  The basic statistics did not show 
support for proposition P2A therefore no further analysis was warranted.  
Summarizing the ANOVA results (Table 24) from below, the number of 
significant differences between means by epoch showed no consistent trends to 
base a pattern on. 
Table 24, ANOVA Summary 
ANOVA Summary Total Q/R Pairs Topic 1.6Hr Blocks 
# of Significant Measures 41 12 13 17 
# of Significant Constructs 12 4 8 8 
# of Significant Modes 2 2 2 1 
 
Similar to ANOVA, considering the Regression Summary (Table 25) and 
counting the number of significant (linear) relationship between a dependent and 
independent variables gives no indication of an increase in significance at the epoch topic 
level. 
Table 25, Regression Summary 
Regression Summary Total Q/R Pairs Topic 1.6Hr Blocks 
# of Significant Measures 41 16 13 13 
# of Significant Constructs 12 6 5 7 
# of Significant Modes 2 2 2 1 
121 
P3:  As the granularity of epochs decreases (epochs gets smaller), the number of 
speech cues to deceptive behavior will increase to an apex then decrease. 
Opposite Supported:  The opposite of this proposition was measured; as the 
granularity increased (epochs got larger) the number of significant speech cues increased 
but not to an apex then decreased.   
 
Figure 26, # of Significant Measures 
Due to a lack of support when looking at individual measures, consideration of 
the number of significant constructs was warranted.  Again, the number of significant 
constructs decreased but this time plateaued.  
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Figure 27, # of Significant Constructs 
Note:  Upon closer examination proposition P3A “Speech cues will have the 
highest correlation with deceptive behavior when epochs are at the topic level” was 
similar enough to P1B that the two could be combined. 
 
Summary of Results 
The following table is a summary of the propositions and whether they are 
supported or not by the analysis above.  As a point of reference the research question is 
repeated here: 
RQ:  Are speech cues to deceptive behavior moderated over time by receiver 
suspicion during dyadic interactions in a real-world high-stakes setting? 
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Table 26, Proposition Summary 
Proposition Summary 
P1 Supported 
P1A Supported 
P1B Opposite of Proposition Supported 
P2 Partial Support 
P2A Not Supported 
P3 Opposite of Proposition Supported 
 
Based on the above it is reasonable to state that the research question was 
supported and that speech cues to deceptive behavior are impacted by receiver’s 
suspicion during dyadic interactions in real-world high-stakes settings.  This dissertation 
also look at whether measurements and constructs, developed by previous researchers, 
could hold up under a RWHS case.  The ANOVA of the 41 behavioral cues measured 
29.3% as significant at the Q/R pair epoch level, 31.7% at the topic level, and 41.5% at 
the 1.6 hr block level.  Given the poor quality of the audio data, this is strong support for 
utilizing these measures in future deception detection research.  Regression also showed a 
strong relationship between the levels of suspicion and the individual measures with 39% 
at the Q/R pair level and 31.7% at both the topic and 1.6 hr levels of granularity as 
significant.  ANOVA and regression showed similar support for the constructs and their 
relationship to suspicion levels.  However, PCA results were more telling, showing five 
very strong constructs and two which could be reduced to fewer measure.  The linguistic 
construct of Quantity and the paralinguistic construct of Time-Duration had all their 
measures load on the same component.  These could be combined into a single construct 
of Voice-Quantity.  The linguistic construct of Affect showed strong loadings for all of its 
measures as did the paralinguistic constructs Intensity and Time-Tempo.  The construct 
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Clarity loaded high on only two measures and Fluency in only one; both of these could 
be reduced in dimension.   
As with any case study, more questions arose than were answered.  The final 
chapter will discuss contributions limitations, and areas for future research. 
 
cxxv 
CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation had three tenets, derived from perceived gaps in existing 
deception detection research.  Specifically, that existing theories on deception crave 
validation outside of the lab in a RWHS setting, where typical dyadic interactions are 
long and more complex than those studied in a controlled laboratory experiment.  There 
are good reasons research in a RWHS setting are rare.  First, it is impossible to ethically 
replicate a RWHS environment and second, it is very difficult to capture the contextual 
complexities like duration and interactivity of free-flowing dyadic communications.     
To focus the study a leading deception detection theory, IDT, was chosen because 
it most closely models real-world dyadic communication.  From this the author set out to 
explore if speech cues to deceptive behavior were moderated over time by receiver’s 
suspicion during dyadic interactions in a RWHS setting.  Fortunately, a wonderful data 
set presented itself in the form of an adjudicated criminal case study.  Because it was an 
exploratory case study, propositions were tested, not hypotheses.  As Yin (2009) pointed 
out, exploratory studies attempt to answer how and why questions with the hope of better 
understanding a problem and assist in formulating quantifiable hypotheses to examine 
later.  Though the methods employed here were exploratory in their implementation they 
did reasonably well in describing the deceptive behavior of the subject. 
 Proposition P1, the difference in speech cues to deceptive behavior will be 
moderated over time by the level of suspicion, was supported.  The Figure 11, Z-Score of 
Significant Measures by Quartile, showed a strong increase in deceptive behavior over 
time vs truthful behavior.  P1A, the magnitude of speech cues to deceptive behavior will 
be positively related to an increase in level of suspicion, also showed strong differences 
in magnitude between truthful and deceptive states (see Figure 12 - Figure 15).  However, 
the difference between the three levels of suspicion which include deception showed 
mixed levels of magnitude.  This could be an artifact of the single case study and the 
small sample size of level 2 of suspicion, those without evidence.    
Proposition P1B, the level of moderation by suspicion will be most detectable 
when epochs are at the topic level and P3, As the granularity of epochs decreases (epochs 
gets smaller), the number of speech cues to deceptive behavior will increase to an apex 
then decrease were supported but in the opposite direction than proposed.  Proposition 
P1B and P3 related to the idea that during a conversation the different types of lies that 
revolve around a topic (i.e. omission, distortion, and half-truths) are more numerous than 
blatant lies about a specific question (Gillespie, Hybnerova, Esmark, & Noble, 2014; 
Kihlstrom, 1995).  So the notion that deception would be most detectable and in greater 
number at the topic level vs any other level was tested.  Surprisingly the opposite 
happened.  As granularity increased (got larger), the number of significant cues 
increased, but not to an apex at the topic level.  The reason for this is difficult to explain.  
However, exploring the relationship between cues to deceptive behavior and the different 
levels of granularity of a conversation will make an interesting future study. 
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Proposition P2, looked for patterns that differentiate deceptive from truthful 
behavior.  Very clear patterns were found when graphical analysis was done, but this is 
not enough evidence to identify patterns in new data sets.  The changes in behavior over 
time may aid other practitioners in the development of hypothesis but for this study the 
author could only concede a partial support. 
A difficulty with this dissertation came from the exploratory methodology itself.  
The tools used to explore and explain what was happening in the data were numerous.  It 
was difficult for the author to choose which tools to use and with each new analysis, new 
questions arose.  This made the focus of the dissertation difficult to hold down.  A 
dissertation should generate four or five future research questions to study.  During this 
dissertation at least a dozen new research questions came up, each one a distraction from 
the current study. 
The length of the interaction was also a good opportunity to examine IDT and 
how a lengthy dyadic communication can be dissected into reasonable units of analysis.  
Several measures and constructs, utilized and validated in existing research, were 
explored and validated in this study.  However, many of the measures and their constructs 
were not significant predictors of deceptive behavior or explained only a fraction of the 
variance.  The reason for their poor predictive power could be explained because the 
study was a single case and the fact that all measurements were taken from an 
uncontrolled environment.  However, this fact does add weight to those measures and 
constructs that were significant predictors of deceptive behavior. 
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Contributions 
In regards to IDT, one contribution of this study is a better understanding of the 
impact suspicion has in a RWHS setting.  IDT was validated to the extent that suspicion 
play a role in sender’s behavior and it affected cue intensity.  It is apparent that not only 
does suspicion play a central role in IDT but that its impact on deceptive speech 
behaviors is measurable in a RWHS environment.  This point is important to unlocking 
future studies involving IDT, suspicion, and RWHS cases. 
Another contribution, this time for practitioners, is the creation of procedures for 
extracting behavioral cues from speech in real-world environments.  This study was 
focused on speech cues that could be easily automated and processed.  The procedures 
followed here were executed in series with human assistance.  However, each step was 
chosen from existing information technology tools which, with a sizable amount of 
coding, could be combined into a single RWHS deceptive behavior analyzer requiring 
very little human input. 
A contribution that was not realized completely was the identification of temporal 
speech patterns for deceptive behavior.  Similar to a finger print it was hoped that a 
pattern would emerge that identified deceptive behavior.  Though patterns which 
followed the constructs developed by others were realized, the temporal aspect was only 
visible in the graphical analysis, not statistically proven.  One complication in doing a 
time series analysis looking for temporal patterns is the non-uniform nature of real-world 
dyadic interviews (Bar-Joseph, 2004).  Though not impossible to overcome, the difficulty 
is much greater and was left for future study (Kahveci & Singh, 2001). 
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The examination of granularity of epochs is another contribution to both IDT and 
deception detection research as a whole.  Some constructs and measures performed better 
at higher levels of granularity (e.g. Time-Tempo) while some were significant across all 
levels (e.g. Quantity).  The behavior of these measures and constructs at different epochs 
could be the subject of a controlled study to isolate the cause and effect of granularity 
with more internal validity than an exploratory study. 
 
Limitations 
Several limitations are common to any case study.  In the current study an 
emphasis was made to limiting research only to a RWHS environment, this raises a 
number of questions.  Was this a typical high-stakes interview?  Mr. Perry was more than 
a suspect, he knew the FBI had evidence against him, but he did not how much evidence 
Det. Wall had against him.  Before the interview he wanted to plea down to six years for 
trafficking in child pornography; after the interview he received life in prison, 470 years 
to be exact.  One could argue that having been caught, even on one criminal charge, he 
did not think he had much to lose by his deception.   
The nature and environment of this real-world case is another limitation and 
potential area for further study.  Longer, dyadic communication indicative of law 
enforcement interviews combined with a lack of fine granularity of episodes suggests the 
need for further research in interview-style communications.  The difficulty is two-fold; 
longer duration interviews will be more difficult to gather in a controlled manner simply 
because volunteers are not going to sit for hours without proper compensation.  Secondly, 
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the free-flowing nature of longer communications makes controlling the study more 
complex. 
Was the quality of audio a factor?  Audio was limited to a monophonic, relatively 
low quality recording in a typical law enforcement interview room, not a controlled 
sound studio.  To put it bluntly, the audio quality was very poor so any noticeable results 
are noteworthy.  Could higher fidelity and stereo make a difference?  One advantage of 
stereo recordings where sender and receiver are on different tracks is the ability to utilize 
additional tools to improve noise reduction and speaker separation.  One such tool is 
dynamic spectral subtraction (DSS), which can be used to extract speech from a single 
noisy channel (He, Xu, & Zhu, 2008).  DSS subtracts an unwanted signal from a voice 
recording even if the unwanted signal is louder than the voice.  In the case where the 
unwanted signal is on a separate channel but bleeds over to the voice channel DSS can 
almost completely separate the unwanted signal with minimal loss of fidelity.   
Another limitation of this study is its scope and application of IDT.  IDT has three 
distinct phases, this study focused only on the central interaction phase.  The 
incorporation of the pre-interaction phase may impact the interactions in a RWHS setting 
more than anticipated.   
With any N=1 study, specific subject characteristics not being observed or 
manipulated may have significant impact on results.  In traditional studies which include 
randomization and much larger sample sizes, unobserved variables can be accounted for 
and confounding factors minimized.  For example, in the present case the subject was 
evaluated by psychologist and deemed not to be a psychopath or suffering from some 
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other mental condition.  Even though an individual is “normal” in the eyes of a 
psychologist, who is to say the mind of a habitual criminal and their expressed behaviors 
are similar to non-criminals.  For instance, Mr. Perry did not perceive rape as violent of 
an act as punching someone or threatening their life.  The subject was not mentally 
unstable or psychotic but his value system was so far from society’s acceptable norms 
that to most people they appear unstable.  This is a limitation of the current study because 
the subject was a confirmed criminal with a long history of crimes.  The results may not 
be applicable to non-criminals who face a unique RWHS deception situation (e.g. spouse 
caught having an affair).  A related limitation, studied many times, is the impact of 
practice on deception.  Successful criminals notoriously hone their deceptive skills in a 
RWHS setting over and over while non-criminals are typically limited to infrequent 
RWHS deception.  With so many severe limitations of real-world data sets, any 
observable behavior changes which distinguish truth from deception are noteworthy.  The 
effort necessary to gather additional RWHS cases to examine should be pursued to 
further the knowledge of deception detection in RWHS situations.   
While processing the data for analysis several issues and questions arose.  First, 
encoding of distinct topics was difficult.  The speech was conversational, so topics were 
often fluid and changed back and forth or overlapped.  If the level of granularity is less 
concrete than words and sentences which have clear delineations, researchers should 
decide ahead of time how the epochs will be handled.  In the case of topic level 
granularity, one could apply a linear dissection, considering any change in topic a new 
instance.  The more complex approach would be to regroup the conversation, putting 
common topics together for analysis.  This would be almost impossible to automate not 
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to mention destroying the integrity of the data timeline.  Implementation of an interface 
program where the investigator could indicate with a press of a button at each new 
question or topic could mitigate this issue.  On a related note, it was found that more than 
one lie can come from a single question/response pair.  If the response was verbose, two 
or more distinct lies could be made.  This made encoding a challenge; does the researcher 
count each deception separately or as one?  In this study if a single response containing 
multiple deceptions was exceedingly long (which was rare) the deceptions were not split 
into smaller segments. 
Another issue that came up during data encoding was the question; should laughs, 
crying, and sobbing be kept and if so how are vocal emotions categorized?  These sounds 
are obviously significant emotionally but from a paralinguistic point of view their wide 
variety may be problematic.  Laughing, crying, and sobbing are often much louder than 
normal speech, which can also create outliers.  Though outside the scope of this study, 
emotional outbursts may hold another key to measuring deception not considered in 
linguistic or paralinguistic behaviors. 
 
Future Research 
The exploratory nature of the study, the volume of data, and the numerous 
methods of analysis used generated many possibilities for future research.  One aspect of 
IDT which should be examined in greater detail is the view that deception involves 
strategic and non-strategic behaviors.  This study’s initial view into a RWHS deceptive 
case did not look for strategic motives.  However, such an examination could produce 
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new insightful knowledge about deception, specifically in the case of longer more 
realistic dyadic interactions.  This study kept IDT at the forefront when choosing the 
research question and subsequent propositions.  However, as mentioned in the literature 
review there are several theories on deceptive behavior, all of which could benefit if 
looked at through a RWHS case study. 
The original data from this case is in video format which could be used as another 
communication channel in which to examine other theories on deception detection.  
Furthermore, the original data covers three separate sessions, one each day in succession.  
This volume of data should be examined in its entirety.  The levels of granularity could 
then include a comparison of sessions to see if the subject’s behavior changes from day to 
day.  Another level of granularity that needs to be examined is the individual word level.  
Individual words were considered in this study but several characteristics were not; for 
example, individual word count comparisons, key words (i.e. highly emotional words, 
unique words, etc.).  One limitation of the current data set which should be considered in 
a separate study is the mono vs stereo audio.  Having all audio on a single track limits the 
tools available for processing audio signals.  With the cooperation of law enforcement 
agencies, excellent audio data can be gathered if they are willing to put a separate 
microphone on the investigator and place the suspects microphone as close to them as 
possible.  In addition, if the investigators are willing to pause slightly between subjects 
and try to stay on topic as much as possible the crossover of Q/R pairs and topic could be 
minimized or avoided completely. 
Another area of future research could lie in the definition of ground truth used in 
this study.  Ground truth was well defined; however, a closer examination of the type of 
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evidence investigators have and their relationship to deceptive behavior could prove very 
interesting.  Several studies have looked at using evidence to assist with detecting 
deception but much could be gained if analysis could be run on RWHS cases (Granhag, 
Strömwall, Willén, & Hartwig, 2013; Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Kronkvist, 2006; 
Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Vrij, 2005).   
The final potential future research areas which will be mentioned are the 
possibility of deception detection automation and the development of a collection of 
RWHS deception case studies.  If a database of RWHS cases in which ground truth is 
established could be collected, it would be invaluable to the field of deception research.  
With the advancement of voice recognition programs which can capture linguistic and 
paralinguistic measures comes a need for processes and procedures to automate deception 
detection.  All the pieces are there, what has not been done is assembling them into one 
complex deception detection system.  The efforts to process the video or audio files in 
this dissertation could be the basis on which such a database could be populated with 
behavioral measures and data sets.  This would be a huge undertaking, most likely 
requiring many interdisciplinary researchers working together.  Before such collaboration 
can begin a large dataset of RWHS cases with a common well defined and validated 
definition of ground truth must be collected.  This deception case data warehouse, like 
this dissertation, will be difficult and painful to collect but well worth the effort in the 
end.
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 APPENDIX A 
Construct Boxplot Graphs of Measures at Q/R Level 
Construct bar graphs with errors. 
 
Figure 28, Quantity Construct 
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Figure 29, Specificity Construct 
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Figure 30, Uncertainty Construct 
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Figure 31, Clarity Construct 
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Figure 32, Immediacy Construct 
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Figure 33, Affect Construct 
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Figure 34, Cognitive Processing Construct 
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Figure 35, Time-Duration Construct 
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Figure 36, Time-Tempo Construct 
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Figure 37, Intensity Construct 
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Figure 38, Frequency Construct 
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Figure 39, Fluency Construct 
 
 
 APPENDIX B 
Construct Bar Graphs of Measures at Q/R Level 
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 APPENDIX C 
Charges Against James Perry 
What follows are the formal charges brought against James Perry that have been released to the 
public.  Because of the nature of some of his crimes some of the details have been redacted or omitted. 
 
 
178 
 
179  
180 
 
181 
 
182 
 
183 
 
184 
 
185 
 
186 
 
187 
 
188 
 
189 
 
190 
 
191 
 
 
 VITA 
 
Joseph York Thomas 
 
Candidate for the Degree of 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Thesis: REAL-WORLD, HIGH-STAKES DECEPTIVE SPEECH: THEORETICAL 
VALIDATION AND AN EXAMINATION OF ITS POTENTIAL FOR DETECTION 
AUTOMATION 
 
Major Field:  Business Administration, Management Information Systems 
 
Education: 
PhD, Business Admin, Mgmt Info Sys:  Oklahoma State University, OK (Dec 2014) 
MA, Information Systems Management (w/ Honors):  Webster University, MO (2003) 
BS, Computer Science (w/ Teacher Certification):  Texas State University, TX (1993) 
 
Experience: 
Director IT Research, May 2013 – Present:  Responsible for AF-level rapid research for the 
Institute for Information Technology Applications in direct support of operational missions.  
Director of Technology & Instructor of Management, Oct 2011 – May 2013:  Course Director 
responsible for content, policy, assessment and instruction for 280 cadets and 6 faculty in core 
management course.   
PhD Student, Jan 2008 – present:  MSIS, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK. 
Commander, Apr 2005 – Dec 2007:  Responsible for effective development, protection, and 
utilization of more than 2,500 military and civilian personnel executing 140+ programs 
valued at more than $3.1B.   
Director of Operations, AF Network Ops & Security Center, Jul 2004 – Apr 2005:  Led 47 
personnel responsible for all operations affecting $7M network control operations center.   
 
Professional Memberships:  Association for Information Systems (AIS), 2014-present 
 
Publications: 
Thomas, J. & Biros, D., (2014). “Theoretical Validation of IDT in Real-World, High-Stakes 
Deceptive Speech”. HICSS, 2014, 48th Hawaii International Conference on System 
Science 2014.  In Press. 
Thomas, J., Chongwatpol, J., Pengnate, F., & Hass, M., (2011). "Data Mining in Higher 
Education: University Student Declaration of Major". MWAIS 2011 Proceedings. Paper 
15. 
Thomas, J. & Biros, D., (2011). "A Conceptual Model of Real World, High Stakes Deception 
Detection", HICSS, 2011, 47th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences 
2011, pp. 1-10. 
Hass, M., Nichols, J., Biros, D., Weiser, M., Burkman, J., & Thomas, J., (2009). "Motivating 
Knowledge Sharing in Diverse Organizational Contexts: An Argument for Reopening the 
Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Debate".  AMCIS 2009 Proceedings. Paper 285. 
